Publications

The Indonesian Palm Oil Pledge (IPOP) was an agreement formed in 2014 by the four largest palm oil trading companies, committing to end deforestation, peatland development, and local exploitation not only in their operations but also across their supply chains. This pledge was initially viewed as a landmark victory for environmental NGOs, representing a significant step forward in the efforts to protect the Indonesian rainforest. However, by 2015, the situation had deteriorated. The Indonesian government, under pressure from domestic interests, began urging companies to withdraw from IPOP. The severe fire season of that year, driven by deforestation and peatland burning for palm oil plantations, further illustrated the agreement's shortcomings and the challenges of enforcement.

In the wake of IPOP’s collapse, several major challenges face business, non-profit, and government actors involved in the palm oil industry. Businesses like Wilmar, the world's largest palm oil trader, encounter difficulties in policing their supply chains to ensure compliance with NDPE (No Deforestation, No Peat, No Exploitation) standards under continuous NGO scrutiny. Additionally, threats of suppliers bypassing Wilmar to sell to markets indifferent to sustainability, such as China and India, threaten the company’s business. On the other hand, the potential loss of concessions designated for conservation due to unfavorable government reaction poses a financial threat as well.

Non-profits, including Greenpeace, grapple with strategic dilemmas about how to pressure the industry to adopt NDPE standards effectively. They must balance the need to enforce stringent environmental standards against the risk of economically harming companies supportive of sustainable practices, all while identifying effective levers of influence.

Government officials sympathetic to environmental concerns face the challenge of formulating policies that balance Indonesia's development needs with environmental protection. They must navigate the intricacies of policy implementation and enforcement in a decentralized governance structure riddled with corruption and ambiguous land-use laws.

Developed in partnership with the National University of Singapore Business School

Recent years have witnessed increasing attention to misconduct and fraud in academic scholarship, particularly in scientific research. As shown in Figure 7.1, retraction rates among publications in scientific journals have increased astronomically – roughly ten-fold since 2000 (Steen, Casadevall, and Fang 2013; Van Noorden 2011). That trend seems both stunning and perplexing if one considers the typical narrative provided to explain these events: Some individual scientist, succumbing to avarice, insecurity, or incompetence, whether knowingly or unwittingly, publishes erroneous findings. His peers nevertheless discover this deviance and ensure its correction. In essence, errant research, whether intentional or not, comes from a set of “bad apples.” But given the slow rate at which turnover occurs in the population of scientists, this explanation would appear to have little purchase in explaining the dramatic rise in retractions over the past decade. Other putative causes – such as the increased competition for scarce funding and positions and improvements in the ability to detect errors and fraud – have also changed far more gradually and slowly than the rate of retractions. Therefore, they would appear incomplete, at best, as explanations for this trend.

During the Great Depression, over half of America's elderly population lacked sufficient income to support themselves, prompting the creation of the Social Security Act in 1935. The Act, designed by Labor Secretary Frances Perkins and signed into law by President Franklin Roosevelt two years after his inauguration, introduced old-age pensions funded by contributions from employees and employers, aimed at providing a minimal income for individuals over the age of 65. The program was designed as a social insurance scheme, ensuring that support was based on earnings during working years rather than a means-tested system. It required an extensive record-keeping infrastructure to track individual incomes and expanded gradually to cover more job categories and increase benefit levels.

In the 2010s, the Social Security fund faces significant challenges. The aging population, with life expectancies continuing to rise, has increased the number of beneficiaries, putting pressure on the system’s financial sustainability. Additionally, the ratio of workers to beneficiaries is declining, exacerbating the strain on the fund. Political debates persist on how to ensure its solvency, with suggestions ranging from privatization to increasing taxes or adjusting benefits.