Publications

In most evaluation systems—such as those governing the allocation of prestigious awards—the evaluator’s primary task is to reward the highest quality candidates. However, these systems are imperfect; top performers may not be acknowledged and thus be underrecognized, and low performers may receive unwarranted recognition and thus be overrecognized. An important feature of many evaluation systems is that people alternate between being candidates and being evaluators. How does experiencing misrecognition as a candidate affect how people subsequently evaluate others? We develop novel theory that underrecognition and overrecognition lead people to reproduce those experiences when they are evaluators. Across three studies—a quasi-natural experiment and two preregistered, multistage experiments, we find that underrecognized evaluators are less likely to grant recognition to others—even to the highest-performing candidates. Conversely, overrecognized evaluators are more likely to grant rewards to others—even to the lowest-performing candidates. Whereas underrecognized evaluator behavior is driven by individuals’ perceptions that their experience was unfair, overrecognized evaluator behavior is driven by the informational cues people glean on how to evaluate others. Thus, in evaluation processes where people oscillate between being the evaluated and being the evaluator, we show how and why seemingly innocuous initial inefficiencies are reproduced in subsequent evaluations.

Should central banks’ inflation targets remain set in stone? We study a dynamic mechanism
design problem between a government (principal) and a central bank (agent). The central
bank has persistent private information about structural shocks. Firms learn the state from the
central bank’s reports and form inflation expectations. A dynamic inflation target implements the
full-information commitment allocation. The central bank is delegated the authority to adjust
the level and flexibility of its target as long as it does so one period in advance. All history
dependence of the mechanism is summarized by the current period’s target. We show that
a declining natural interest rate and a flattening Phillips curve imply opposite optimal target
adjustments. We leverage our framework to study longer-horizon time consistency problems
and speak to practical policy questions of inflation target design.

This paper develops a theory-based, explainable deep learning convolutional neural network (CNN) classifier to predict the time-varying emotional response to music. We design novel CNN filters that leverage the frequency harmonics structure from acoustic physics known to impact the perception of musical features. Our theory-based model is more parsimonious, but it provides comparable predictive performance with atheoretical deep learning models while performing better than models using handcrafted features. Our model can be complemented with handcrafted features, but the performance improvement is marginal. Importantly, the harmonics-based structure placed on the CNN filters provides better explainability for how the model predicts emotional response (valence and arousal) because emotion is closely related to consonance—a perceptual feature defined by the alignment of harmonics. Finally, we illustrate the utility of our model with an application involving digital advertising. Motivated by YouTube’s midroll ads, we conduct a laboratory experiment in which we exogenously insert ads at different times within videos. We find that ads placed in emotionally similar contexts increase ad engagement (lower skip rates and higher brand recall rates). Ad insertion based on emotional similarity metrics predicted by our theory-based, explainable model produces comparable or better engagement relative to atheoretical models.

This article concerns itself with fees that Apple and Google might charge to business users in their respective mobile ecosystems. We lay out the economic analysis behind the goals of the DMA—contestability and fairness—as they apply to third-party app store access fees. We focus on the access fees for alternatives to the Apple App Store, as this has become contentious in the early enforcement of the DMA. Much of our analysis, however, also applies also to Google and/or any other designated gatekeeper.

We study a retirement savings plan with a default contribution rate of 12% of income, which is much higher than previously studied defaults. Twenty-five percent of employees had not opted out of this default 12 months after hire; a literature review finds that the corresponding fraction in plans with lower defaults is approximately one-half. Because only contributions above 12% were matched by the employer, 12% was likely to be a suboptimal contribution rate for employees. Employees who remained at the 12% default contribution rate had average income that was approximately one-third lower than would be predicted from the relationship between salaries and contribution rates among employees who were not at 12%. Defaults may influence low-income employees more strongly in part because these employees face higher psychological barriers to active decision making.

A critical element of word of mouth (WOM) or buzz marketing is to identify seeds, often central actors with high degree in the social network. Seed identification typically requires data on the relevant network structure, which is often unavailable. We examine the impact of WOM seeding strategies motivated by the friendship paradox, which can obtain more central nodes without knowing network structure. Higher degree nodes may be less effective as seeds if these nodes communicate less with neighbors or are less persuasive when they communicate; therefore, whether friendship paradox–motivated seeding strategies increase or reduce WOM and adoption remains an empirical question. We develop and estimate a model of WOM and adoption using data on microfinance adoption across village social networks in India. Counterfactuals show that the proposed strategies with limited seeds are about 13%–30% more effective in increasing adoption relative to random seeding. These strategies are also on average 5%–11% more effective than the firm’s leader seeding strategy. We also find these strategies are relatively more effective when we have fewer seeds.

We hypothesize that “low-contrast categories” (those lacking sharp differentiation from adjacent categories) catalyze the creation of groundbreaking inventions by influencing two key stages in the life of an invention: (1) idea-creation and (2) idea-positioning. During “idea-creation,” low-contrast categories increase the likelihood that descendant inventions will combine the focal invention with more (a) boundary-spanning, (b) novel, (c) original, and (d) atypical knowledge inputs. During “idea-positioning,” they allow greater leeway in articulating how descendant inventions depart from the focal invention’s lineage and chart new technological directions. We find robust support for our hypothesis using data from the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s classification system spanning nearly four decades. Further analyses demonstrate that the catalyzing effect of low-contrast categories has important material consequences: inventions classified in low-contrast categories spur descendant inventions that generate substantially higher economic value and exert more enduring technological impact than those in high-contrast categories. By introducing the concept of catalyzing categories, this study offers a novel theoretical perspective on the genesis of groundbreaking inventions and the role of categorical structures in the inventive process.

We model the optimal resolution of insolvent firms in general equilibrium. Collateral- constrained banks lend to (i) solvent firms to finance investments and (ii) distressed firms to avoid liquidation. Liquidations create negative fire-sale externalities. Liquidations also re- lieve bank balance-sheet congestion, enabling new firm loans that generate positive collateral externalities by lowering bank borrowing rates. Socially optimal interventions encourage liqui- dation when firms have high operating losses, high leverage, or low productivity. Surprisingly, larger fire sales promote interventions encouraging more liquidations. We study synergies be- tween insolvency interventions and macroprudential regulation, bailouts, deferred loss recog- nition, and debt subordination. Our model elucidates historical crisis interventions.

The origin of the modern joint-stock company is typically traced to the concomitant appearance of large-scale maritime trading companies in England and the Netherlands in the early seventeenth century. Highlighting medieval cases in southern Europe, we claim that the joint-stock company emerged earlier in history. These prior appearances support the theory of convergent evolution towards the joint-stock company. We document alternative and largely independent developmental paths that suggest the joint-stock company can emerge in a variety of legal, political and socioeconomic contexts. This evidence has implications for identifying the necessary background underlying the emergence of the joint-stock company, and for the debate regarding the link between business institutions and economic growth.

Growing socio-economic inequality poses one of the greatest challenges to society, thereby raising new questions about the responsibility of corporations to address its effects. Inequality also poses material risks to business performance. Like climate risk, inequality can impact business across a broad set of sectors and economies on a global scale. To mitigate risks and leverage opportunities to generate positive outcomes from corporate sustainability investments, managers and investors need better data on the business risks posed by inequality and the impact of corporate conduct on it. However, the current transparency infrastructure is inadequate to meet this need. This article reviews the current state of corporate disclosure on inequality and assesses its utility to companies as well as investors and other stakeholders. Drawing on innovations in climate disclosure, we suggest a path forward for companies and investors to drive improved disclosure from companies on the risks presented by socio-economic inequality.

While traditional change management emphasizes gradual tactics like pursuing small wins and building coalitions, in turbulent times these gradual tactics aren’t necessary—and they can hold leaders back from taking advantage of bigger opportunities. Research from healthcare settings during Covid show that both senior leaders and frontline managers are more successful at prompting change during turbulent times when they do three things: 1. Selecting a shovel-ready idea and reframing it as a solution to a problem at hand as well as long-term success, 2. Moving quickly to take advantage of a window in time when people are more open to change, and 3. Thinking more expansively about what’s possible.

We empirically characterize how China is internationalizing its bond market by staggering the entry of different types of foreign investors into its domestic market and propose a dynamic reputation model to explain this strategy. Our framework rationalizes China's strategy as trying to build credibility as a safe issuer while reducing the cost of capital flight. We use our framework to shed light on China's response to episodes of capital outflows.

Environmental jolts can trigger more conducive conditions for driving change in organizations. However, punctuated equilibrium theories of organizational change concentrate on top managers’ implementation of de novo radical changes after jolts. Existing research has not examined frontline-driven, incremental change efforts during these periods of disrupted stasis, despite the value of frontline change ideas. We develop a process model to explain how and when those on an organization’s front lines can leverage a jolt to opportunistically implement long-desired change ideas in ways that promote their retention. We conducted a two-year qualitative field study at a hospital during the Covid-19 pandemic, examining the trajectories of 33 premeditated change ideas raised by frontline staff. By comparing ideas that persisted to become part of normal operations with those that failed to be selected or retained, we identified practices and conditions that promoted the selection and retention of frontline change ideas. Our study suggests that frontline change advocates can seed the long-term retention of “shovel-ready” ideas—as opposed to de novo ideas—after a jolt by rapidly and opportunistically deploying a novel set of practices before the brief window of opportunity created by lessened constraints and increased managerial receptivity closes. Prior theories of change largely assume frontline-driven change to be slow and continuous, proceeding in a one-off fashion; we explain how and when frontline change can instead occur in rapid, opportunistic bursts. This study advances theories of punctuated equilibrium and bottom-up change in organizations by unearthing an alternative way that change can be intentionally accomplished in organizations.

We study non-monetary markets where objects that arrive over time are allocated to unit-demand agents with private types, such as in the allocation of public housing or deceased-donor organs. An agent’s value for an object is supermodular in her type and the object quality, and her payoff is her value minus her waiting cost. The social planner’s objective is a weighted sum of allocative efficiency (i.e. the sum of values) and welfare (i.e. the sum of payoffs). We identify optimal mechanisms in the class of direct-revelation mechanisms. When the social planner can design the information disclosed to the agents about the objects, the optimal mechanism has a simple implementation: a first-come first-served waitlist with deferrals. In this implementation, the object qualities are partitioned into intervals; only the interval containing the object quality is disclosed to agents. When the planner places a higher weight on welfare, optimal disclosure policies become coarser.

We study the socially optimal level of illiquidity in an economy populated by house- holds with taste shocks and present bias with naive beliefs. The government chooses mandatory contributions to accounts, each with a different pre-retirement withdrawal penalty. Collected penalties are rebated lump sum. When households have homoge- neous present bias, β, the social optimum is well approximated by a single account with an early-withdrawal penalty of 1 − β. When households have heterogeneous present bias, the social optimum is well approximated by a two-account system: (i) an account that is completely liquid and (ii) an account that is completely illiquid until retirement.

Geoeconomics is the use of a country’s economic strength to exert influence on foreign entities to achieve geopolitical or economic goals. We discuss how concepts of power in the political science and economics literature can be used to guide research on geoeconomics. Economic threats as a form of coercion have seen a recent resurgence. We show how different types of threats can be modeled using simple tools and discuss what channels their potential effectiveness is based on. We discuss important open questions for the future literature to pursue.

A common-sense moral intuition is that bad acts should be condemned according to severity. Yet seven experiments (N = 6,075 U.S. adults) show that the extent to which people differentiate between transgressions hinges on the direction of comparison. When scaling up from a less severe transgression to a more severe one, people readily express stronger condemnation of the worse transgression. But when scaling down from a more severe transgression to a less severe one, they differentiate less, often condemning the lesser transgression just as strongly as one that is transparently worse. Indicating that one transgression is less bad than another can be construed as downplaying such transgressions, signaling bad moral character. Supporting this account, the asymmetry is larger for judgments that implicate moral character and for transgressions that seem especially important to condemn. Observers’ moral-character judgments reveal a similar pattern, suggesting that the asymmetry is reinforced by social incentives.

Online platforms are rife with racial discrimination, but current interventions focus on employers, rather than customers. We propose a customer-facing solution: changing to a two-point rating scale (dichotomization). Compared with the ubiquitous five-star scale, we argue that dichotomization reduces modern racial discrimination by focusing evaluators on the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ performance, thereby reducing how personal beliefs shape customer assessments. Study 1 is a quasi-natural experiment on a home-services labour platform (n = 69,971) in which the company exogenously changed from a five-star scale to a dichotomous scale (thumbs up or thumbs down). Dichotomization eliminated customers’ racial discrimination whereby non-white workers received lower ratings and earned 91 cents for each US dollar paid to white workers for the same work. A pre-registered experiment (study 2, n = 652) found that the equalizing effect of dichotomization is most prevalent among evaluators holding modern racist beliefs. Further experiments (study 3, n = 1,435; study 4, n = 528) provide evidence of the proposed mechanism, and eight supplementary studies support measurement and design choices. Our research offers a promising intervention for reducing customers’ subtle racial discrimination in a large section of the economy and contributes to the interdisciplinary literature on evaluation processes and racial inequality.

Consensus analyst target prices are widely available online at no cost to investors. In this paper we examine how the amount of dispersion in the individual target prices comprising the consensus affects the predictive association between the consensus target price and future returns. We find that returns implied by consensus target prices and realized future returns are positively correlated when dispersion is low, but they become highly negatively correlated when dispersion is high. Further analyses suggest that the differing effect of dispersion stems from incentive-driven staleness in price targets by some analysts after bad news. As a stock performs poorly and some analysts are slow to update their target prices, dispersion increases, and the consensus target price becomes too high. This has important implications for how consensus analyst target prices should inform investment decisions. We show that a hedge strategy taking a long (short) position in stocks with the highest predicted returns among stocks with the lowest (highest) dispersion earns more than 11% annually. Finally, we show that the negative correlation between consensus-based predicted returns and future realized returns for high-dispersion stocks exists mainly for stocks with high retail interest, suggesting that unsophisticated investors are misled by inflated target prices that are available freely online.