Publications

For more than 150 years, the founding mission of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) guided the organization while enabling it to address evolving challenges in animal welfare. Under Matt Bershadker, ASPCA’s president and CEO, the company faced mounting pressure to engage with a growing stream of societal matters far afield from its core purpose. The case explores Bershadker’s initiative to develop a clear, strategic framework for considering which societal issues to address. This effort would clarify the ASPCA’s approach to these issues by evaluating them against the organization’s strategy, history, policies, and key stakeholder relationships, ensuring consistency, transparency, and mission-driven decision-making.

Bayer AG is a German multinational pharmaceutical and life sciences company founded in 1863. It operates globally in over 90 countries with approximately 100,000 employees as of 2024. Bayer is structured into three main business segments: Pharmaceuticals, Consumer Health, and Crop Science, with significant global operations and an extensive patent portfolio. The company is a leader in agricultural products, prescription medicines, and over-the-counter health products. It also focuses on innovative solutions for healthcare and agricultural challenges.

The current dilemma for students to address are issues related to Bayer’s transition to a new operating model called Dynamic Shared Ownership (DSO). This model, introduced under the leadership of CEO Bill Anderson, aims to flatten the corporate hierarchy and create a nimbler, customer-centric organization. The transition involves removing the existing hierarchical structure, which previously consisted of 12 management layers, and replacing it with self-managed teams. This structural change was referred to internally as the "hardware."

The initial steps under DSO included substantial organizational redesign, involving layoffs and the establishment of self-managed teams. The Board of Management successfully halved the number of management layers to five or six and replaced thousands of middle managers with self-managed teams. A complementary aspect of DSO, labeled the "software," focused on fostering cultural changes to promote new mindsets, norms, and behaviors among Bayer’s nearly 100,000 employees.

Notwithstanding several early wins, the Board of Management is now grappling with implementing new talent management and personnel policies that align with the DSO model. Existing HR processes and systems, which are designed for a hierarchical organization, need to be reinvented. Questions about compensation, career pathing, and performance metrics must be addressed to ensure these new systems support the DSO framework effectively.

What is keeping Lidl, Europe’s preeminent grocery chain, from gaining similar success in the U.S?

Upon entry to the U.S. market in 2017, Lidl US aspired to open 1,000 stores in its first years. But the company was unable to attract US consumers. By 2024, Lidl had managed to open fewer than 200 stores, capturing less than 1% of the market. To right the expansion effort in 2023, Joel Rampoldt became Lidl US’s fourth president. In 2024, he faced critical issues in the selection of store locations, assortment, customer relationship management, and effectively communicating Lidl US’s value proposition in a crowded and competitive market.

When Kinya Seto became CEO of LIXIL in 2016, he faced two major challenges: integrating a workforce spread across several acquired brands and differentiating LIXIL in a housing and water technology industry where products were seen as commodities. This case explores how LIXIL developed and activated its corporate purpose—"To Make Better Homes a Reality for Everyone, Everywhere"—as a unifying and strategic force. The purpose became a guiding “North Star,” brought to life through an ambitious new business unit focused on delivering low-cost, eco-friendly toilets to underserved communities around the world. This purpose-driven approach also helped unite employees, spark innovation, and address the challenge of product commoditization.

Nike describes its purpose with reference to three “Purpose Pillars”: People, Planet, and Play. Each pillar sets targets, tracks progress, and assesses outcomes tied to compensation. This approach helps Nike navigate complex social issues and stakeholder relationships, often translating corporate principles into actionable strategies.

In March 2020, Alex Funk, Deal Team Lead at Palladium Equity Partners, LLC, a private equity firm, was grappling with what to do with the student transportation company he had purchased just weeks earlier.

When he closed the deal with American Logistics Company (ALC) to acquire its subsidiary, ALC Schools, Funk was excited about the acquisition and eager to grow the company, which provided transportation to children with special needs. Operating largely in the Pacific Northwest, ALC maintained that it had no true competitors and was the industry leader in its market niche. ALC benefitted from federal and state laws which mandated that school districts provide transportation for children with special needs. Traditional yellow buses were often not suitable, and school districts found alternative options such as taxis unaffordable, providing a wide opening for ALC.

Palladium’s due diligence had confirmed ALC Schools’ attractive profitability, impressive operational prowess, and rapidly growing, recurring revenue from long-term, evergreen contracts with school districts. Funk planned to transform ALC into an Uber-like system, establishing a nationwide footprint. The fund was so enthusiastic about ALC’s prospects that it had purchased the firm at a multiple 30-40% higher than its preferred range.

But in March of 2020, the bottom fell out. Schools across the United States were shutting down due to the COVID-19 epidemic and nobody knew when they would re-open. ALC’s revenues dropped to zero. Funk had to come up with a plan to deal with the acquisition. He knew he had three options: kill (take the loss; sell off ALC Schools’ assets and liquidate); freeze (continue funding ALC Schools at minimal levels and wait out the pandemic); or build (invest in growth opportunities despite the pandemic).

The rapid rise in the number of PE funds searching for acquisitions across various sectors and size ranges has greatly enhanced exit options for private owners of businesses. The pool of potential buyers now extends far beyond competitors or other corporate acquirors. Significant competition among PE firms under pressure to invest large pools of capital has increased average purchase multiples to historic highs.

Business owners should not assume, however, that heated PE competition correlates to a high probability of their own successful sale. There is much at stake for business owners in launching a process to market their company for sale. Private owners tend to underestimate the substantial time, money, and distraction involved in a transaction process and may likely overestimate the probability of success. Additionally, the investment bankers pitching their services have an inherent conflict in providing advice regarding the sale process. An investment banker's livelihood depends on earning fees contingent on the completion of a sale, and they have less at stake in convincing an owner to start a process. As a result, a private business owner may likely be inadequately informed and not fully comfortable in making this momentous decision.

The purpose of this note is to help business owners make informed decisions as they contemplate a sale process. I highlight five fundamental questions a seller should consider before initiating a sale process:

• Am I ready for this huge transition?

• Do I fit what a buyout firm wants?

• Should I launch a sale process?

• How should I prepare for a sale process?

• How do I avoid getting taken advantage of?

Over the first two decades of the 21st century, Rio Tinto, a 150-year-old global mining leader, faced significant volatility as it navigated an increasingly globalized and financialized economy. Mining companies, heavily reliant on commodity prices, struggled after the 2008 Great Recession, leading to cost-cutting measures and changes in how they managed their global operations.

In May 2020, Rio Tinto legally blasted two sacred, 46,000-year-old caves at Juukan Gorge in Western Australia to access $135 million worth of iron ore. The decision deeply distressed the Traditional Owners, who had long opposed the action, and sparked widespread criticism from the government, investors and communities. The fallout led to the resignation of Rio Tinto’s CEO, two senior executives, and the board chair. Jakob Stausholm, formerly CFO, became CEO in January 2021. This case provides background and traces the events that precipitated Rio Tinto’s decision to blow the Juukan Gorge caves—and the ensuing stakeholder backlash.

This case, Rio Tinto Aftermath, picks up where the case Rio Tinto leaves off. Jakob Stausholm has just assumed the helm of international mining giant Rio Tinto following stakeholder uproar over the company’s decision in May 2020 to dynamite two sacred, 46,000-year-old caves at Juukan Gorge in Western Australia to extract iron ore. Case Rio Tinto Aftermath examines how Stausholm addressed the dilemma over the next four years and how a company that loses its social license to operate (SLO) can take steps to regain it.

Specifically, readers learn how leaders diagnose deep-rooted issues and strategically use crises to implement transformation strategies: in Rio’s case, by systemically and holistically embedding value-based culture change to regain SLO and improve future competitiveness. The case details Stausholm’s efforts to perform root-cause analysis; build leadership capacity; redefine and live Rio’s objectives, values, and purpose; resurrect and modernize the company’s historical good DNA; overhaul community relation systems; and embed financial and non-financial metrics.

How should the federal government respond to the collapse of the Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), the 16th largest bank in the United States?

SVB collapsed on Friday, March 10, 2023, after an unprecedented run on deposit during which customers requested $42 billion of withdrawals in a single day. The value of SVB’s securities portfolio had declined severely. The bank had bet on long-term government securities, and when the Fed raised interest rates, the mark-to-market value of this asset had dropped precipitously. Ninety-Four percent of the bank’s deposits were uninsured, so customers reacted quickly when rumors spread that the bank might be insolvent.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) had taken the unusual action of closing the bank on a Friday morning. Now, the Biden administration, the Federal Reserve and the FDIC had the weekend to decide what to do and coordinate a response. SVB’s collapse had sent shock waves through the banking sector. A few other banks with a large percentage of uninsured deposits and exposure to the hike in interest rates were rumored to be in trouble. Financial pundits were raising the question of whether this might lead to a financial crisis as occurred  after the failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008. There were also the SVB depositors who had not been able to get their money out of the bank in time – many of them tech start-ups that were a major driver of the economy.

Senior policymakers at the Treasury, the Fed, and the FDIC faced decisions that were politically fraught. Obviously, a recession would be politically unpopular. But the decision in 2008 to provide subsidies to banks had also proved contentious. Both the left and right had decried what they perceived to be “bank bailouts.”

Policymakers knew they had to react quickly. Before them, they had a number of options that could limit the fallout from SVB’s collapse. They also had to devise a communications strategy that calmed the markets and the public. Finally, they had to start the long process of examining what went wrong at SVB in order to ensure that it did not happen again.  

The Thorny Hill Club was established in 1901 to provide a welcoming and refined environment for faculty members to gather, dine, and engage in intellectual discourse. The Club quickly became a central hub for social activities, allowing faculty to entertain visiting scholars, friends, and alumni. Housed in a stately building featuring classic decor reminiscent of the early 20th century, the Club is furnished with 20 tables accompanied by 80 finely crafted chairs. Regular patrons of the Club include members from the Finance Department, the Sociology Department, and several members of the University Development Office.

At the heart of The Thorny Hill Club’s operations is a dedicated and skilled team led by General Manager Sue Fresco and Chef Tom Bilgewater. Fresco oversees the Club’s daily operations, while Chef Bilgewater, known for his culinary precision and creativity, commands the kitchen with authority. The Club also employees a 10-person hospitality staff comprised of cooks and food preparers, a half dozen servers, and a two-person maintenance staff. Recently, group dynamics have been challenging for Fresco to manage, as difficulties and dissent have arisen within the culinary team, within the server group, and between hospitality and maintenance staff, who serve in separate unions.

General Manager Sue Fresco is facing other significant challenges at Thorny Hill Club. One pressing issue is the implementation of a new kiosk system for take-out orders. This new system, while aimed at improving efficiency and expanding service, has been met with resistance from both kitchen and server staff who are struggling to adapt. Simultaneously, Fresco is also grappling with the financial strain caused by the persistently unprofitable catering business. For seven years, the catering division has posted losses, resulting in a $1.45 million shortfall in the latest financial cycle, which has pushed the Club’s overall financial performance into the red. The combined pressure of managing technological adoption and addressing the financial instability of the catering business is putting considerable strain on Fresco’s leadership.

Vital Farms operated in the premium egg market. It was founded in 2007 by Matt O'Hayer, who predicted a growing market of consumers willing to pay a premium price for ethically produced foods. O'Hayer built a network of small family farms committed to strict environmental standards, ensuring humane treatment of the hens and ethical practices. The company's high quality and clever marketing led to significant growth.

O'Hayer based the organization on "Conscious Capitalism" as espoused by John Mackey, co-founder of Whole Foods Market, and Professor Raj Sisodia. Under this model, the company sought to support the interests of diverse stakeholders — including investors, farmers, employees, consumers, communities, the environment, and the hens and cows that produced Vital Farms' products. To formalize its commitment to stakeholders, Vital Farms received certification as a B Corp and reincorporated as a Delaware Public Benefit Corporation.

Initially funded by O'Hayer's resources, the company attracted private investors and impact funds aligned with its mission as it grew. In 2020, Vital Farms recognized the need for a significant capital infusion to maintain its growth trajectory. As it looked to raise capital, O'Hayer and Vital Farms CEO Russell Diez-Conseco faced the challenge of balancing its stakeholder interests against the pressures from capital markets, where investor priorities often dominated, while maintaining its commitment to conscious capitalism values. Potential options included seeking additional impact investors or venture capital, taking on debt, or considering public market offerings. Given the benefits and challenges inherent in each option, what path was best for the company, its investors, its stakeholders, and its mission?

The founders of Warby Parker had a clear vision of the kind of company they wanted to build: a novel business model that would disrupt a long-entrenched industry. The company’s values would create a culture that the founders themselves—and, they hoped, many others—would find meaningful and even fun. Their social impact mission wouldn’t be a philanthropic afterthought but an integral part of the business’s core. Purpose and profit would be pursued simultaneously, along with a commitment to building mutually beneficial relationships with customers, partners, communities, and other key stakeholders. They debated these and other critical details two years before the company was operational or even had a name.

The case examines the founders’ original business design for Warby Parker—a holistic approach that aligned and integrated purpose, a values-based culture, and business strategy with a commitment to building trusted relationships with stakeholders. The case also explores the actions taken by leadership to preserve this design as the company scaled, adapted and, ultimately, became a public corporation.

Yale Athletics operates a comprehensive and diverse program including 35 NCAA Division I varsity sports, intramurals, and club sports, all coordinated under the direction of Victoria M. "Vicky" Chun, the Thomas A. Beckett Director of Athletics. The department oversees significant athletic facilities such as Payne Whitney Gymnasium, the Yale Bowl, the Yale Golf Course, and additional specialized fields and rinks. This operation is underpinned by approximately 170 full-time employees who manage athletic medicine, business operations, compliance, event management, sports performance, student-athlete development, sports performance, communication, marketing, and community engagement.

Current opportunities for Yale Athletics include:

1. Corporate Sponsorships: Yale Athletics aims to optimize its corporate sponsorship portfolio by analyzing current offerings and improving how media and sponsorships are packaged and priced. This area is crucial for securing financial support and enhancing the advertising value for partners.

2. Ticketing and Price Analytics: The department is reevaluating its ticket pricing strategies to both increase game attendance and revenue. Comparative market research is being used to consider pricing strategies.

3. Community Outreach and Fan Engagement:  Post-pandemic, there is an effort to attract more fans from the local community. Yale Athletics is working on a cohesive outreach strategy and defining goals for fan attendance, balancing innovative marketing practices with Yale’s mission.

4. Employee Outreach and Engagement: Enhancing internal engagement is a priority. Despite efforts to keep the university’s large on-campus population informed about sports events, there is a focus on leveraging new technologies, creating better game-day experiences, and ensuring effective communication.

5. Artificial Intelligence:  Exploring the use of AI technologies to improve operational efficiency and service delivery is on the agenda. This involves utilizing AI for better customer service, advanced market research, and provide further support of administrative functions.

These challenges reflect Yale Athletics' commitment to maintaining excellence and fostering a vibrant sports environment within the university and community.

The Chicago Fire is a Major League Soccer (MLS) team acquired by Andell Holdings, an investment firm led by Andrew Hauptman. Purchased for $35 million in 2007, the Fire experienced significant struggles with its home venue, Toyota Park in Bridgeview Illinois, due to poor public transport access and suboptimal maintenance. Despite growing league fortunes and increased sponsorships, the team’s location in suburban Bridgeview posed a significant strain on the popularity of the club.

To effectuate its expansion plans and address these challenges, Andell Holdings must make two critical decisions regarding its ownership of the Chicago Fire. First, Hauptman needs to evaluate the financial and operational ramifications of relocating the team to Soldier Field in downtown Chicago despite the large payments the village of Bridgeview was demanding to break the team’s long-term lease on Toyota Park. This decision hinges on calculating the required increase in attendance to offset the financial burden and considering other non-economic benefits such as brand visibility and fan engagement. Second, Hauptman must determine the optimal timing and strategy for Andell’s exit from Fire ownership. The sale of Andell’s stake required assessing when the team’s valuation would peak and the impact of any decisions regarding the team’s home venue. 

Elemental Excelerator is a not-for-profit fund established in 2017 by Dawn Lippert. With $36 million of funding, the organization focuses on investing in for-profit businesses that aim to mitigate climate change while embedding equity and social justice into their solutions. 

The fund faces a dilemma in selecting the last companies for its 2023-2024 cohort of climate tech businesses. With only one or two slots remaining, Elemental must decide how to balance its portfolio. Options include prioritizing technologies in the electric power and transportation sectors favored by the Inflation Reduction Act, or continuing to diversify in buildings, agriculture, and industry, sectors with few sustainable climate solutions. Another consideration is whether to focus on companies that already attract venture capital or support those overlooked by investors.  Yet another concern is balancing sustainability with social justice. Six very different companies are presented as finalists.

Nike, as a global leader in athletic footwear and apparel, experiences significant dilemmas when choosing which societal issues to confront. In the contemporary business landscape, stakeholders—including investors, customers, employees, and communities—expect companies to address a range of controversial topics such as racial justice, gender equality, climate change, and voting rights.

The challenges for Nike are multifaceted. Key decisions rest on whether an issue aligns with Nike’s “Purpose Pillars,” which include commitments to people, the planet, and play. These pillars guide Nike’s strategy and operations, helping determine whether to engage with a particular issue. For example, diversity and inclusion directly relate to Nike's core consumers and historical partnerships, making them integral to its brand identity.

However, Nike must navigate the risks associated with taking a public stance. Missteps can impact reputation, consumer loyalty, and sales. The company carefully assesses the potential impact on various stakeholders, including employees and athletes, before deciding to engage. This assessment is critical since different groups may have conflicting expectations or reactions to the company’s position on contentious issues.

A dedicated team, including CEO John Donahoe, evaluates these factors, exploring implications and weighing potential risks and benefits. This thorough vetting process ensures Nike’s responses are consistent with its core identity and capability to make a meaningful impact.

Nike, a global leader in athletic footwear and apparel, is committed to advancing sustainability through innovation. Its purpose is to inspire and innovate for every athlete while moving the world forward by building community, protecting the planet, and increasing access to sport. Responding to the industry's significant environmental impact, Nike has established ambitious goals under its "Move to Zero" initiative, aiming to power all owned facilities with 100% renewable energy by 2025 and divert 99% of its footwear manufacturing waste from landfills.

The Space Hippie project exemplifies Nike's commitment to sustainability by striving to create the lowest carbon footprint shoe in the company's history. In 2019, Nike tasked a small team with designing a shoe that would maintain performance, comfort, and aesthetic appeal while being manufacturable with readily available materials and contributing meaningfully to the company's climate goals. This project challenged Nike to reconsider all aspects of its established practices, from design and materials to manufacturing and marketing, emphasizing the importance of sustainability in innovation.

In late 2023, Orange Grove Bio co-founder and CEO Marc Appel considered the future of his private drug development investment firm. Orange Grove Bio, (OGB) had finished its fourth- year nurturing promising early-stage drugs for new treatments of cancer, autoimmune, and inflammatory disease. The possibility of an influx of new capital was good. The company was thinking about launching additional rounds of private equity financing. Furthermore, Appel expected three of its portfolio companies to be cleared by the Federal Drug Administration for initial tests on people by 2025.

Teleconferencing with his executive team, CEO Appel gamed out possible future strategic directions for OGB. One possibility was building the company’s infrastructure. OGB could buy a contract research organization (CRO) to do bench work, sift through enormous data sets from lab tests, and conduct animal and human clinical trials on novel therapeutics. Having this technology in-house instead of paying outside companies for it would expand OGB’s capabilities and cut costs. Or the company could simply invest in building more wet labs for its portfolio companies.

Another possibility was building more relationships to increase OGB’s pipeline. The company had been built on the premise that valuable research to in-license was being ignored in universities located away from the biotech hot spots of Boston and San Francisco. OGB had invested in establishing connections with scientists in universities away from these locations, and even moved its headquarters to Cincinnati to take advantage of this opportunity. The team also had started looking internationally, considering relationships with universities and biotech firms outside the United States. However, creating productive alliances required resources and time. OGB had to consider the importance not only of the breadth but also the depth of its scientific alliances.

Appel also discussed the idea of starting an associated venture capital fund to leverage the firm’s relationships with investors and drug companies. OGB had been established to nurture promising scientific work ready for clinical trials on people. Its business model was to in-license biological discoveries from academia to build businesses around, with the plan of selling these for large profits to pharmaceutical companies when the underlying molecules showed promise of improving human health in tests on people. The company could also look further ahead in the development cycle and in-license medicines approaching the end of human clinical testing and possibly reap profits on the next blockbuster drug.

Or the company, for now, could just stand on its original business model and develop its existing portfolio of eight early-stage, preclinical subsidiaries. What would attract the most investor interest? OGB was building toward an eventual IPO, but in 2023, market conditions for biotech firms were deteriorating. The U.S. S&P 500 Biotechnology Industry index fell 50 percent in the third quarter of 2023 from its high in 2021.5 The sector was in its worst shape in 20 years, some analysts said.  And venture capital funding had sunk to a six-year low amid worries about high interest rates and inflation. Given the market conditions, what would be the smartest move?