Private Equity and Financial Stability: Evidence from Failed-Bank Resolution in the Crisis

We investigate the role of private equity (PE) in the resolution of failed banks after the 2008
financial crisis. Using proprietary failed bank acquisition data from the FDIC combined with data
on PE investors, we find that PE investors made substantial investments in underperforming and
riskier failed banks. Further, these acquisitions tended to be in geographies where the other local
banks were also distressed. Our results suggest that PE investors helped channel capital to
underperforming failed banks when the “natural” potential bank acquirers were themselves
constrained, filling the gap created by a weak, undercapitalized banking sector. Next, we use a
quasi-random empirical design based on proprietary bidding data to examine ex post performance
and real effects. We find that PE-acquired banks performed better ex post, with positive real effects
for the local economy. Our results suggest that private equity investors had a positive role in
stabilizing the financial system in the crisis through their involvement in failed bank resolution.