Please join us on Thursday, October 25 at 1:00 p.m. for a book presentation and discussion of Sir Paul Tucker’s new book, Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State, which has been published by Princeton University Press. Sir Paul, who was deputy governor of the Bank of England from 2009 to 2013 and is now the chairman of the Systemic Risk Council, will provide a summary of his work. Then a panel–including Prof. Gary Gorton, Prof. Bruce Ackerman, Prof. Yair Listokin, and Prof. William English–will provide their perspectives on the book. Andrew Metrick, the Janet Yellen Professor of Finance and Management, will moderate the panel.

Following the event, Sir Paul will sign copies of his book. The first 50 registrants will receive complimentary copies. This event is open to the Yale Community and registration is required.

A panel of experts discussed the role that central banking plays in democracies, asking whether these institutions have too much unchecked power, during a panel discussion at the Yale School of Management on October 25.

“Central banks are an example of concentrated, unelected power in our societies,” said Sir Paul Tucker, chairman of the Systemic Risk Council and former Bank of England deputy governor. “There’s not enough discussion of the fact that the Federal Reserve are lawmakers, because they are regulators.”

Tucker’s new book, Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State, was recently published by Princeton University Press.

After Tucker’s introductory comments, panelists from the Yale community shared their thoughts on the book and the issue. Andrew Metrick, the Janet Yellen Professor of Finance and Management, served as moderator. Panelists included Gary Gorton, the Frederick Frank Class of 1954 Professor of Management & Professor of Finance; William English, professor in the practice of finance; Bruce Ackerman, Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science; and Yair Listokin, the Shibley Family Fund Professor of Law.

Central banks, Tucker said, have both “quasi-fiscal powers and lawmaking power,” but central bankers are not elected by the constituents whose lives their policies impact. Healthy democracies need to periodically reconsider the implications of the autonomy that central banks wield, especially since their latitude increased following the most recent crisis.

Tucker emphasized that central bankers today need to better explain their role to the public and to members of legislative assemblies, and to collaborate and communicate more among themselves—even when there isn’t a crisis looming.