TAP@Yale seeks to improve our understanding of how digital platforms—and the different economic models that sustain them—impact both the nature of economic competition and the benefits accruing to consumers in price terms, but also in variety and quality of content, and in innovation. This understanding will help us develop new analysis that can lead to effective antitrust enforcement that protects consumers and content providers in these markets, and also to advance the thinking on regulatory solutions that would lay the foundations for competitive markets and also monitor conduct to sustain competition.
Digital Tech Acquisition Datasets
TAP research assistants scoured resources in the Yale library and public resources to identify all acquisitions made by Google and Facebook over the last ten years. As much information about each one as we could find is included in the spreadsheet. Many thanks to Maria Casasnovas and Mark Rosenberg for their work and to the Washington Center for Equitable Growth for providing a grant for these datasets.
Digital Tech Reports
(informally known as the Stigler Report)
A committee of scholars chaired by Fiona Scott Morton issued a report in May 2019 outlining consumer harms caused by the market power of digital platforms like Google and Facebook, and proposing updated antitrust enforcement and regulation to address them.
New Competition Framework for the Digital Economy: Report by the (German) Commission ‘Competition Law 4.0’ (2019)
This commission was set up by the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy in September 2018, and tasked with drawing up recommendations for the further development of EU competition law in light of the new challenges of the digital economy.
Commissioner Vestager has asked Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, and Heike Schweitzer to explore how competition policy should evolve to continue to promote pro-consumer innovation in the digital age.
ELI Project Team has drawn up a set of Model Rules that is meant as a contribution to the ongoing debate and provides a ‘visualisation’ of how a balanced approach could look, if regulatory action is considered necessary.
Modernising the Law on Abuse of Market Power: Report for the (German) Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (2018)
This report looks at whether a modernization of the (European and German) rules on the abuse of market power is needed.
U. K. Competition and Markets Authority: Online Platforms and Digital Advertising Market Study Interim Report (2019)
Publication of interim report and consultation on whether to make a market investigation reference (final report due in July 2020)
(informally known as the Furman Report)
This expert panel was asked to consider the potential opportunities and challenges the emerging digital economy may pose for competition and pro-competition policy, and to make recommendations on any changes that may be needed.
Brave, a free and open-source web browser, filed a formal GDPR complaint against Google for infringing the GDPR “purpose limitation” principle. Enforcement would be tantamount to a functional separation of Google’s business.
Williams-Sonoma, a retail company that sells kitchen-wares and home furnishings, filled a formal accused Amazon.com of selling unauthorized Williams-Sonoma merchandise on its website. It also claimed the retail giant “unfairly and deceptively engaged in a widespread campaign of copying” designs of its West Elm furniture for its own furniture line, Rivet.
An online merchant has accused Amazon.com Inc. of forcing him and other sellers to use the company’s expensive logistics services, which in turn forces them to raise prices for consumers.
This lawsuit, which stems from the Cambridge Analytica scandal, is about Facebook’s practice of sharing its users’ personal information with third parties.The plaintiff sare current and former Facebook users who believe that their information was compromised by the company.
These plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves, and as a class action, seeking damages and injunctive relief pursuant to federal law and pursuant to various state antitrust, unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and consumer protection laws of the states against Amazon.
Research Supporting Antitrust Enforcement of Digital Platforms
- The role of artificial intelligence
- Z. Brown and A. MacKay (2020), "Competition in Pricing Algorithms," forthcoming.
- The role of behavioral biases in the creation of barriers to entry and market power
- A. de Corniere (2016) "Search Advertising.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
- W. Wen and F. Zhu, (2018). “Threat of Platform-Owner Entry and Complementor Responses: Evidence from the Mobile App Market.” Strategic Mangement Journal.
- The role of behavioral biases on the quality of content experienced by consumers
- The measurement of quality in light of zero money prices, and implications for quality-adjusted prices
- D. Acemoglu, A. Makhdoumi, A. Malekian & A. Ozdaglar, (2019). “Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets.” forthcoming.
- J. G. Gans, (2019). "The Specialness of Zero." forthcoming.
- E. Brynjolfsson, A. Collis, W. E. Diewert, F. Eggers & K. J. Fox, (2019). "GDP-B: Accounting for the Value of New and Free Goods in the Digital Economy." NBER Working Paper, No. 25695.
- Tools to assess the impact of potential competitors and nascent competition on consumer welfare
- Analysis of competition and foreclosure on a platform between a vertically-integrated complement and a complement that is independent
- F. Zhu (2019). “Friends or Foes? Examining Platform Owners’Entry into Complementors’ Spaces.” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
- A. de Corniere and G. Taylor. (2019). "Upstream Bundling and Leverage of Market Power." forthcoming.
- J. P. Choi, D. Jeon, (2018). "A Leverage Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets.” TSE Working Paper.
- Analysis of competition on a platform between complements when the complement could grow into a rival of the platform itself
- G. Parker, M. Van Alstyne, (2018). ``Innovation, Openness, and Platform Control.”" Management Science. Vol. 64, No. 7
- G. Parker, M. Van Alstyne, X. Jiang, (2017) ``Platform Ecosystems: How Developers Invert the Firm.'' MIS Quarterly. Vol. 41, No. 1.
- Definition of antitrust markets when consumers are substituting between complements on a given platform and between platforms
- G. Biglaiser, J. Crémer, and A. Veiga, (2019). “Migration between platforms,” TSE Working Paper.
- Tools and analysis of innovation harms