TAP@Yale seeks to improve our understanding of how digital platforms—and the different economic models that sustain them—impact both the nature of economic competition and the benefits accruing to consumers in price terms, but also in variety and quality of content, and in innovation. This understanding will help us develop new analysis that can lead to effective antitrust enforcement that protects consumers and content providers in these markets, and also to advance the thinking on regulatory solutions that would lay the foundations for competitive markets and also monitor conduct to sustain competition.
A committee of scholars chaired by Fiona Scott Morton issued a report in May 2019 outlining consumer harms caused by the market power of digital platforms like Google and Facebook, and proposing updated antitrust enforcement and regulation to address them.
Read the committee’s report
Research Supporting Antitrust Enforcement of Digital Platforms
- The role of behavioral biases in the creation of barriers to entry and market power
- A. de Corniere (2016) "Search Advertising.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
- W. Wen and F. Zhu, (2018). “Threat of Platform-Owner Entry and Complementor Responses: Evidence from the Mobile App Market.” Strategic Mangement Journal.
- The role of behavioral biases on the quality of content experienced by consumers
- The measurement of quality in light of zero money prices, and implications for quality-adjusted prices
- D. Acemoglu, A. Makhdoumi, A. Malekian & A. Ozdaglar, (2019). “Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets.” forthcoming.
- J. G. Gans, (2019). "The Specialness of Zero." forthcoming.
- E. Brynjolfsson, A. Collis, W. E. Diewert, F. Eggers & K. J. Fox, (2019). "GDP-B: Accounting for the Value of New and Free Goods in the Digital Economy." NBER Working Paper, No. 25695.
- Tools to assess the impact of potential competitors and nascent competition on consumer welfare
- Analysis of competition and foreclosure on a platform between a vertically-integrated complement and a complement that is independent
- F. Zhu (2019). “Friends or Foes? Examining Platform Owners’Entry into Complementors’ Spaces.” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
- A. de Corniere and G. Taylor. (2019). "Upstream Bundling and Leverage of Market Power." forthcoming.
- J. P. Choi, D. Jeon, (2018). "A Leverage Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets.” TSE Working Paper.
- Analysis of competition on a platform between complements when the complement could grow into a rival of the platform itself
- G. Parker, M. Van Alstyne, (2018). ``Innovation, Openness, and Platform Control.”" Management Science. Vol. 64, No. 7
- G. Parker, M. Van Alstyne, X. Jiang, (2017) ``Platform Ecosystems: How Developers Invert the Firm.'' MIS Quarterly. Vol. 41, No. 1.
- Definition of antitrust markets when consumers are substituting between complements on a given platform and between platforms
- G. Biglaiser, J. Crémer, and A. Veiga, (2019). “Migration between platforms,” TSE Working Paper.
- Tools and analysis of innovation harms