CHARTING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

U.S. Strategy and Outcomes
Introduction

The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and subsequent Great Recession constituted the worst shocks to the United States economy in generations. Books have been and will be written about the housing bubble and bust, the financial panic that followed, the economic devastation that resulted, and the steps that various arms of the U.S. and foreign governments took to prevent the Great Depression 2.0. But the story can also be told graphically, as these charts aim to do.

What comes quickly into focus is that as the crisis intensified, so did the government's response. Although the seeds of the harrowing events of 2007-2009 were sown over decades, and the U.S. government was initially slow to act, the combined efforts of the Federal Reserve, Treasury Department, and other agencies were ultimately forceful, flexible, and effective. Federal regulators greatly expanded their crisis management toolkit as the damage unfolded, moving from traditional and domestic measures to actions that were innovative and sometimes even international in reach. As panic spread, so too did their efforts broaden to quell it. In the end, the government was able to stabilize the system, re-start key financial markets, and limit the extent of the harm to the economy.

No collection of charts, even as extensive as this, can convey all the complexities and details of the crisis and the government's interventions. But these figures capture the essential features of one of the worst episodes in American economic history and the ultimately successful, even if politically unpopular, government response.
Antecedents of the Crisis
In the years leading up to the crisis, the underlying performance of the U.S. economy had eroded in important ways.
ANTECEDENTS

Because the growth of productivity and the labor force had slowed in the decade before the crisis, the potential economic growth rate was falling.

Average growth in real potential GDP (August 2018 estimate)

5%

Sources: Congressional Budget Office, "An Update to the Economic Outlook: 2018 to 2028"; internal calculations
ANTECEDENTS
Overall prime-age participation in the labor force had been falling, as the participation of women slowed and men’s continued a decades-long decline.

Civilian labor force participation rates for people ages 25-54, indexed to January 1990=100

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics via Haver Analytics
ANTECEDENTS

Income growth for the top 1 percent had risen sharply, driving income inequality to levels not seen since the 1920s.

Cumulative growth in average income since 1979, before transfers and taxes, by income group

Source: Congressional Budget Office, “The Distribution of Household Income, 2014"
ANTECEDENTS

Household debt as a share of income had risen to alarming heights.

Aggregate household debt as a share of disposable personal income (after taxes)

Sources: Federal Reserve Board Financial Accounts of the United States; Federal Reserve Board, "Household Debt-to-Income Ratios in the Enhanced Financial Accounts"

Mortgage debt

Consumer debt
Meanwhile, the financial system was becoming increasingly fragile.
ANTECEDENTS

A “quiet period” of relatively low bank losses had extended for nearly 70 years and created a false sense of strength.

Two-year historical loan-loss rates

Sources: Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.; Federal Reserve Board; International Monetary Fund
ANTECEDENTS

The “Great Moderation” — two decades of more stable economic outcomes with shorter, shallower recessions and lower inflation — had added to complacency.

Quarterly real GDP growth

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis via Federal Reserve Economic Data
ANTECEDENTS

Long-term interest rates had been falling for decades, reflecting decreasing inflation, an aging workforce, and a substantial rise in global savings.

Benchmark interest rates, monthly

Sources: Federal Reserve Board and Freddie Mac via Federal Reserve Economic Data
ANTECEDENTS

Home prices across the country had been rising rapidly for nearly a decade.

Real Home Price Index, percentage change from 1890

+100%

Home prices had increased modestly through several boom-and-bust cycles since the 1970s, but started a much more dramatic rise in the late 1990s.

ANTECEDENTS

Credit and risk had migrated outside the regulated banking system.

Credit market debt outstanding, by holder, as a share of nominal GDP

Source: Federal Reserve Financial Accounts of the United States
Notes: GSE: government-sponsored enterprise (including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac); ABS: asset-backed securities; MMF: money market funds
ANTECEDENTS

The amount of financial assets financed with short-term liabilities had also risen sharply, increasing the vulnerability of the financial system to runs.

Net repo funding to banks and broker-dealers

$2.00 trillion

Source: Federal Reserve Board Financial Accounts of the United States
ANTECEDENTS

The regulatory capital regime for the U.S. financial system was inadequate.

Tier 1 common equity as a percent of risk-weighted assets

14%

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

'01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08

Tier 1 common equity

All U.S. financial institutions

Largest U.S. bank holding companies

The pre-crisis capital ratios did not reflect the growing risks.

Sources: Capital ratios: Federal Reserve Bank of New York's Research and Statistics Group; tangible common equity to tangible assets: company reports

Tangible common equity to tangible assets ratio

4.0%

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0

'08 '07 '06 '05 '04 '03 '02 '01

Estimated capital and funding ratios, Q4 2007

- Commercial bank
- Investment bank

Some institutions more dependent on short-term funding were more leveraged.

Reliance on short-term funding*

* Determined by share of financial assets pledged
The Arc of the Crisis
ARC OF THE CRISIS

The financial crisis unfolded in several phases.

Bank credit default swap spreads and Libor-OIS

500 basis points

Increasing Stress  Early Escalation  Breaking the Panic and Resolution

Source: Bloomberg. Note: Credit default swap spreads are equal-weighted averages of JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs.
ARC OF THE CRISIS

Home prices peaked nationally in the summer of 2006, then fell rapidly — eight major cities had declined more than 20 percent by March 2008.

Change, July 2006–March 2008
- Detroit: –22.5%
- San Francisco: –22.6
- Miami: –23.1
- Tampa: –23.4
- Los Angeles: –24.4
- San Diego: –25.6
- Phoenix: –26.6
- Las Vegas: –27.7

U.S. peak: July 2006

U.S. change by March 2008: –9.0%

Sources: S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller Home Price Indexes for 20 individual cities and National Home Price Index via Federal Reserve Economic Data
ARC OF THE CRISIS

Stress in the financial system built up gradually over late 2007 and early 2008, as mortgage troubles and recession fears increased.

Libor-OIS spread

400 basis points

2009 2008 2007

Source: Bloomberg     Note: GSE: government-sponsored enterprise
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guaranteed half of all U.S. mortgages, or nearly $4.4 trillion worth of debt.

As the housing market deteriorated, deepening losses at both GSEs sparked investor concerns of insolvency, driving their share prices lower.

**ARC OF THE CRISIS**

Investors were fearful that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac might soon be swamped by losses …

Stock price of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

$80 a share


**Morgan Stanley takes $3.7 billion loss** on subprime mortgage exposure; other big banks also warn of huge writedowns.

**Fannie Mae reports $1.4 billion loss** on Nov. 9, 2007, amid deteriorating loan delinquencies.

**Freddie Mac reports $2 billion net loss** and low capital reserves, Nov. 20, 2007

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guaranteed half of all U.S. mortgages, or nearly $4.4 trillion worth of debt.

As the housing market deteriorated, deepening losses at both GSEs sparked investor concerns of insolvency, driving their share prices lower.
ARC OF THE CRISIS

…and raised similar concerns about the nation’s largest banks and investment banks.

S&P 500 Financials index level and average of six big banks’ CDS spreads, in basis points

Source: Bloomberg. Note: Credit default swap spreads are equal-weighted averages of JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs.
The rise in losses, the fear of further losses, and the liquidity pressures on the system pushed the price of financial assets down and added to concerns about the solvency of the financial system.
Yet the economic forecasts suggested a modest and manageable slowdown in economic growth. The reality was far worse.

Real GDP, percent change from preceding quarter, SAAR, and Philadelphia Fed surveys of professional forecasters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
<th>Q3</th>
<th>Q4</th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
<th>Q3</th>
<th>Q4</th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
<th>Q3</th>
<th>Q4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis via Federal Reserve Economic Data (data update of August 29, 2018); Philadelphia Federal Reserve Survey of Professional Forecasters, 3Q 2007 and 1Q and 3Q 2008
The U.S. Strategy
Among the key elements of the U.S. policy response were:

**Use of the Fed’s lender of last resort authorities** beyond the banking system, for investment banks and funding markets.

**An expansive use of guarantees** to prevent runs on money funds and a broad array of financial institutions.

**An aggressive recapitalization of the financial system**, in two stages, backed by expanded FDIC guarantees.

**A powerful use of monetary and fiscal policy** to limit the severity of the recession and restore economic growth.

**A broad mix of housing policies** to prevent failure of the GSEs, slow the fall of home values, lower mortgage rates, and aid in refinancings.

**An extension of dollar liquidity** to the global financial system, combined with international cooperation and Keynesian stimulus.
The U.S. government’s initial response to the crisis was gradual, and the tools were limited and antiquated because they were designed for traditional banks.

### TOOLS AVAILABLE

**FDIC**
- Resolution authority for banks, with systemic risk exemption to allow FDIC to provide broader guarantees.
- Deposit insurance for banks.

**Federal Reserve**
- Discount window lending for banks, and in extremis for other institutions.
- Swap lines for foreign central banks.

### NO AUTHORITY

- To intervene to manage the failure or nationalize nonbanks.
- To guarantee the broader liabilities of the financial system.
- To inject capital into the financial system.
- For the Fed to purchase assets other than Treasuries, Agencies and Agency MBS.
- To inject capital or guarantee the GSEs.
But the response became more forceful and comprehensive as the crisis intensified and Congress provided new emergency authority.

Source: Libor-OIS: Bloomberg
U.S. STRATEGY
The U.S. government deployed a mix of systemic policies to stabilize financial institutions and markets …

Liquidity programs to keep financial institutions operating and credit flowing to consumers and businesses.

Guarantee programs to support critical funding markets for financial institutions.

Government interventions to prevent the failure of systemic institutions.

Recapitalization strategies to address the solvency questions hovering over the financial system.
As the crisis intensified, the U.S. government’s liquidity programs expanded along several dimensions:

- Domestic to International
- Traditional to Novel
- Institutions to Markets
U.S. STRATEGY

The Federal Reserve initially deployed its traditional lender of last resort tools to provide liquidity to the banking system …

Federal Reserve discount window usage

Term Auction Credit Facility (TAF) usage

Use of the Fed’s discount window

Banks were reluctant to borrow from the Fed’s discount window over fear it would signal they were in financial trouble …

Foreign banks

U.S. banks

… so the Fed initiated TAF in a similar role, and opened it to both domestic and foreign banks.

Sources: Federal Reserve Board; internal calculations
U.S. STRATEGY

... and then expanded its tools to support dealers and funding markets.

Securities lent to dealers: Term Securities Lending Facility

$600 billion

500

Term Securities Lending Facility

400

The Fed established the TSLF to promote liquidity in U.S. Treasury bonds and other important collateral markets ...

300

200

100

0

2007 2008 2009 2010

Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) loans

$600 billion

500

Primary Dealer Credit Facility

400

... and then created the PDCF to provide emergency liquidity to investment banks, which did not have access to the discount window.

300

200

100

0

2007 2008 2009 2010

Source: Federal Reserve Board via Federal Reserve Economic Data

Note: PDCF includes loans extended to select other broker-dealers.
The Fed and Treasury also introduced programs to support the commercial paper market, a key source of funding to financial institutions and businesses …

Overnight issuance as a share of outstanding commercial paper

Anxious investors demanded ultra-short terms for commercial paper as concerns their holdings were tainted by troubled MBS caused liquidity to evaporate.

- **AMLF and money market guarantees** Sept. 19, 2008
  Fed establishes ABCP Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility; Treasury announces temporary guarantee program for money market mutual funds

- **Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF)** established by Fed, Oct. 7, 2008

- **Lehman Bankruptcy** Sept. 15, 2008

- **BNP Paribas freezes three funds** over MBS concerns, Aug. 9, 2007

- **Master Liquidity Enhancement Conduit (MLEC)** On Oct. 15, 2007, Treasury facilitates plan for private banks to support the ABCP market; it is never implemented

Source: Federal Reserve
U.S. STRATEGY

...and helped restart the asset-backed securitization market, an important source of funding for credit cards, auto loans, and mortgage lending.

Asset-backed securities (ABS) issuance, TALF-eligible issuance, and amount pledged to TALF

Sources: Total issuance level: Bloomberg; amount pledged to TALF: Federal Reserve Board
The U.S. government put in place a mix of guarantees to backstop critical parts of the financial system.
U.S. STRATEGY

Treasury agreed to guarantee about $3.2 trillion of money market fund assets to stop the run on prime money market funds.

Daily U.S. money market fund flows

+$ 90 billion

Prime institutional money market funds flows

Lehman bankruptcy
Sept. 15, 2008

Treasury announces money market fund guarantees
Sept. 19, 2008

Treasury opens guarantee program
Sept. 29, 2008

Reserve Primary Fund “breaks the buck”
Sept. 16, 2008 The fund held some short-term Lehman debt that became worthless after the bankruptcy

Sources: iMoneyNet; internal calculations based on “Runs on Money Market Mutual Funds,” American Economic Review
The FDIC expanded its deposit insurance coverage limits on consumer and business accounts in an effort to prevent bank runs…

Increased coverage gave consumers and businesses more confidence that their money was safe…

FDIC guarantees non-interest bearing accounts through the Transaction Account Guarantee Program, Oct. 14, 2008

Sources: Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., "Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2008–2013"; U.S. Treasury Department, "Reforming Wall Street, Protecting Main Street"
U.S. STRATEGY

... and by agreeing to guarantee new financial debt, the FDIC helped institutions obtain more stable funding.

Senior unsecured U.S. bank debt issuance under TLGP (DGP)*

Average-weighted CDS spread for six big banks

FDIC bank debt guarantees

Nonbanks

Bank holding companies

Traditional banks

Sources: Debt issuance: Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.; internal calculations; CDS spreads: Bloomberg

*Debt Guarantee Program covered debt issued by both the parent company and its affiliates
The U.S. government moved to strengthen the capital in the financial system as the crisis intensified and Congress provided emergency authority.

Encouraged the biggest institutions to raise private capital early in the crisis.

Injected substantial government capital into the banking system as the crisis worsened.

Stabilized the most troubled banks with additional capital and asset ringfence guarantees.

Conducted stress tests to complete the recapitalization of the financial system.
As losses worsened early in the crisis, U.S. policymakers urged financial institutions to raise private capital.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private capital raised, billions</th>
<th>Common equity</th>
<th>Preferred equity</th>
<th>Other Tier 1</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BANKS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Citigroup</td>
<td>$43.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank of America</td>
<td>33.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPMorgan Chase</td>
<td>25.9</td>
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<td>Wells Fargo</td>
<td>8.5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>INVESTMENT BANKS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Goldman Sachs</td>
<td>$13.0</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Morgan Stanley</td>
<td>15.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Merrill Lynch</td>
<td>23.4</td>
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<td><strong>TRUST AND PROCESSING BANKS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>BNY Mellon</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>State Street</td>
<td>4.1</td>
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</table>

Sources: Goldman Sachs; Bloomberg

Private capital raised before government investments
Then, as panic followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Treasury made large capital investments in the biggest banks using new authority from Congress …

Private and government capital raised between Oct. 14, 2008 and May 6, 2009, the day before stress test results were released.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BANKS</th>
<th>Capital raised, billions</th>
<th>Government preferred equity</th>
<th>Government Targeted Investment Program capital</th>
<th>Private preferred equity</th>
<th>Private other Tier 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citigroup*</td>
<td>$59.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank of America</td>
<td>35.0</td>
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<td>37.7</td>
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<td>Goldman Sachs</td>
<td>$15.8</td>
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<td>Morgan Stanley</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Merrill Lynch</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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$10 billion goes to Bank of America after acquisition of Merrill Lynch.

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<td>$3.0</td>
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<td>State Street</td>
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</table>

Source: Goldman Sachs

*Citigroup ultimately also converted approximately $58 billion of government and other preferred stock into common shares.
By the end of 2008, more than 200 banks had received funds under the Capital Purchase Program. Overall, $205 billion would be distributed to 707 banks. An additional $40 billion was split between Citigroup and Bank of America under the Targeted Investment Program.

Sources: Timeline of funds outstanding: TARP Tracker; banks receiving funds, by asset size: U.S. Treasury, “Troubled Asset Relief Program: Two Year Retrospective”; banks receiving funds, by state: internal calculations based on TARP Investment Program transaction reports, August 8, 2018
The government expanded its tools with additional capital injections and asset guarantees for the most troubled banks, Citigroup and Bank of America.

Asset Guarantee Program (AGP), Citigroup assets, and “ringfence” loss responsibility structure

Pool of Citigroup assets: $301 billion

1st Loss
Citigroup $39.5 bil.
Treasury $5.0 bil.

2nd Loss
Citigroup $0.6 bil.
FDIC $10.0 bil.

3rd Loss
Citigroup $1.1 bil.

Tail Loss
Citigroup $24.5 bil.
Fed $220.4 bil.

U.S. STRATEGY

Other

MBS, commercial real estate $76.3 billion

Home mortgage loans $175.1 billion

Sources: Asset Guarantee Program terms: Special Inspector General for TARP; “Extraordinary Financial Assistance Provided to Citigroup, Inc.”; CDS spreads: Bloomberg
The government provided emergency loans, capital, and guarantees to AIG to prevent a disorderly failure that would have disrupted the financial system.

Outstanding commitment to AIG

$200 billion

- **Fed establishes $85 billion credit facility Sept. 16, 2008**, taking an 79.9 percent equity stake in AIG
- **Fed commits additional $37.8 billion Oct. 8, 2008**
- **$40 billion TARP investment from Treasury; Fed authorizes Maiden Lane II and III to purchase AIG’s mortgage-related assets, Nov. 10, 2008**
- **Treasury commits $30 billion more; Fed restructures its commitment**, including a $25 billion credit facility cut in exchange for preferred stakes in AIG’s foreign life insurance subsidiaries AIA and ALICO

Recapitalization closes, Jan. 14, 2011: Fed loans are paid off and remaining interests transferred to Treasury which receives 92% of AIG common stock; (Maiden Lane II and III remain with Fed)

- **In a series of stock sales, Treasury cuts its AIG stake to 22% March-Sept. 2012**
- **Final securities sold from Maiden Lane II Feb. 28, 2012**
- **Final securities sold from Maiden Lane III August 2012**
- **Government makes $23 billion profit after Treasury sells final shares in AIG, Dec. 2012**

Source: U.S. Treasury

Note: Repayments occurred over the lifetime of the commitment. Any reduction in the commitment, however, is not reflected until the January 2011 recapitalization transaction.
U.S. STRATEGY

As confidence in banks further eroded, government “stress tests” increased transparency, helping regulators and investors make credible loss projections …

Two-year historical loan-loss rates for commercial banks

10%

9.1%

Fed’s loss estimates for the stress test were higher than peak losses in the Great Depression

SCAP capital shortfall, May 7, 2009

BIGGEST CAPITAL RAISES NEEDED

- Bank of America $33.9
- Wells Fargo $13.7
- GMAC $11.5
- Citigroup $5.5 billion*

* $58.1 billion was raised by converting preferred shares into equity

SMALLER CAPITAL RAISES NEEDED

- $2.5 Regions Financial
- $2.2 SunTrust Banks
- $1.8 Morgan Stanley
- $1.8 KeyCorp
- $1.1 Fifth Third Bank
- $0.6 PNC Financial

No additional capital was needed at nine other institutions

Sources: Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.; Federal Reserve Board; International Monetary Fund

Note: The 19 largest bank holding companies at the time were subject to the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP).
U.S. STRATEGY

... and accelerated the return of private capital.

Private capital raised, May 7, 2009, through Dec. 31, 2010

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<td>6.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Merrill Lynch</td>
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Source: Goldman Sachs
Indeed, the U.S. recapitalized its banking system more quickly and aggressively than Europe.

U.S. STRATEGY

Capital raised each year

$120 billion

U.S. Banks
~90% of 2008-16 capital was raised 2008-10

European Banks
~50% of 2008-16 capital was raised 2008-10

Source: Goldman Sachs
Alongside programs designed to address the systemic problems in the financial system, the Fed and Treasury put in place a forceful mix of monetary policy and fiscal stimulus.
As the Fed funds rate neared zero, the Fed made large-scale asset purchases to drive down long-term interest rates — a policy known as quantitative easing.

Fed Funds target rate or range and 10-year Treasury rate

Net asset purchases, monthly

Sources: Target rate: Federal Reserve Board; 10-year Treasury: Federal Reserve Board via Federal Reserve Economic Data; monthly asset purchases: Haver Analytics
U.S. STRATEGY

The U.S. passed the first fiscal stimulus very early in the crisis. But at $168 billion, it was relatively small and needed time to take effect.

Quarterly effect of fiscal stimulus measures on GDP

Sources: Council of Economic Advisers; Congressional Budget Office; Bureau of Economic Analysis; calculations by Jason Furman

Note: $168 billion represents the combined stimulus from pre–Recovery Act measures through 2012.
U.S. STRATEGY

The Recovery Act of 2009 provided a larger mix — $712 billion — of temporary tax cuts and spending increases, offsetting some but not all of the fall in GDP.

Quarterly effect of fiscal stimulus measures on GDP

![Bar chart showing the estimated impact on GDP from fiscal legislation, with distinct bars for Pre-Recovery Act, Recovery Act, and Post-Recovery Act periods.](chart)

Sources: Council of Economic Advisers; Congressional Budget Office; Bureau of Economic Analysis; calculations by Jason Furman

Note: $712 billion represents the stimulus from the Recovery Act through 2012.
A further $657 billion from a series of smaller post-Recovery Act measures added to the level of economic support ...

Quarterly effect of fiscal stimulus measures on GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated impact on GDP from fiscal legislation</th>
<th>Pre-Recovery Act</th>
<th>Recovery Act</th>
<th>Post-Recovery Act</th>
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<tr>
<td>+4.0%</td>
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<td>+3.0</td>
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<td>+2.5</td>
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Sources: Council of Economic Advisers; Congressional Budget Office; Bureau of Economic Analysis; calculations by Jason Furman

Note: $657 billion represents the combined stimulus from post–Recovery Act measures through 2012.
...but even as the federal government ramped up stimulus, state and local cutbacks worked against the effort.

Real state and local government purchases during recoveries, 1960-2015, indexed to quarterly level at trough

During the recovery from the financial crisis, however, state and local governments cut spending sharply, working against federal efforts.

In past recessions, state and local governments increased spending during recoveries.

Average across recessionary periods from 1960-2007

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; internal calculations
Note: Average does not include the 1980 recession owing to overlap with the 1981–82 recession.
The government put in place a series of housing programs:

- To lower mortgage rates and ensure the availability of credit
- Help reduce mortgage foreclosures
- Help struggling borrowers refinance mortgages to take advantage of lower rates
The government’s housing programs brought down mortgage rates and reduced foreclosures but were not powerful enough to contain the damage.

Sources: Mortgage rates: Freddie Mac via Federal Reserve Economic Data; foreclosure completions: CoreLogic
Government support of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac kept mortgage credit flowing and stabilized the housing market after private issuers pulled back.

Mortgage-related securities issuance

Spread between FNMA 30-year current coupon MBS and 10-year Treasury

Sources: MBS issuance: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association; agency MBS spread: Bloomberg
U.S. STRATEGY

Loan modification programs, including HAMP, directly or indirectly helped nearly 9.9 million struggling homeowners with their mortgages.

Mortgages receiving modification aid, April 1, 2009, through November 30, 2016

Sources: Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (FHA loss mitigation); U.S. Treasury (HAMP modifications); HOPE Now Alliance (HOPE Now modifications; CoreLogic (foreclosure completions, quarterly average of annual rate) Note: Modifications through Nov. 2016; other program results through 2016.
U.S. STRATEGY

The HARP program lowered mortgage rates, encouraged refinancings, and helped “underwater” homeowners avoid foreclosure.

Loans refinanced through the Home Affordable Refinancing Program

Sources: Federal Housing Finance Agency; foreclosure completions: CoreLogic
U.S. STRATEGY
The government’s programs helped millions of homeowners, but were slow to take effect and reached a limited number of people threatened by foreclosure.

Homeowners assisted through crisis-era loan modification programs and other foreclosure prevention actions

12 million

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special refinancings</th>
<th>Loan modifications</th>
<th>Other borrower assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.5 million</td>
<td>9.2 million</td>
<td>5.7 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAMS</th>
<th>Through 2012</th>
<th>Through 2017</th>
<th>Through 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HARP</td>
<td>Completed refinances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHFA</td>
<td>Streamline refinances</td>
<td>Through 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHA</td>
<td>Streamline refinances</td>
<td>Through 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAMP</td>
<td>All trial and permanent loan modifications</td>
<td>Through 2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOPE NOW</td>
<td>Proprietary modifications</td>
<td>Through 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSE</td>
<td>FHFA HAMP-like modifications through GSEs</td>
<td>Through 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHFA</td>
<td>HomeSaver advance; repayment plans; forbearance plans; and foreclosure alternatives</td>
<td>Through 2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHA</td>
<td>Loss mitigation interventions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATE AND LOCAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY INITIATIVES</td>
<td>Mortgages and financed units</td>
<td>Through 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Making Home Affordable program performance reports; HOPE NOW; Federal Housing Finance Agency foreclosure prevention reports and refinance reports; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development housing scorecards; Federal Housing Finance Agency aggregate reports; Center for American Progress, “A House America Bond for State Housing Finance Agencies”
U.S. STRATEGY

Even though the crisis started in the United States, its impact reverberated around the world — and the response required U.S. policymakers to work closely with their global counterparts to:

Establish central bank swap lines
to address dollar funding shortages

Coordinate monetary policy
to send powerful message to the markets

Arrange for IMF support
for emerging countries affected by the crisis
By Oct. 14, 2008, the Fed had expanded currency swap lines to essentially unlimited amounts with four central banks: ECB, Switzerland and the Banks of England and Japan. Limited swap lines were arranged with 10 other central banks:

- Canada
- Australia
- Sweden
- Brazil
- Mexico
- South Korea
- Singapore
- Denmark
- Norway
- New Zealand

Sources: Central bank liquidity swaps: Federal Reserve Board, internal calculations; maximum commitments: National Bureau of Economic Research, “Central Bank Dollar Swap Lines and Overseas Funding Costs”
U.S. STRATEGY

The Federal Reserve and the world’s major central banks orchestrated a coordinated interest rate cut.

Central bank target interest rates for each country (month-end)


Source: Bloomberg
The G-20 agreed in April 2009 to establish a $500 billion lending facility, allowing the IMF to provide substantial aid to countries affected by the crisis.

IMF credit outstanding for all members

Source: International Monetary Fund
Outcomes
OUTCOMES

The severity of the stress of the 2008 financial crisis was, in some respects, worse than in the Great Depression.

Stock market prices from peak

Nominal house prices from peak

Decline in household wealth

OUTCOMES

The U.S. government response ultimately stopped the panic and stabilized the financial system ...

Bank CDS spreads and Libor-OIS spread

Source: Bloomberg     Note: Credit default swap spreads are equal-weighted averages of JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs.
OUTCOMES

... and allowed the economy to slowly begin digging out of a deep recession.

Treasury, Federal Reserve, and FDIC exposures; real GDP and employment, year-over-year percent change (monthly)

OUTCOMES

The response helped restart the credit markets and bank lending so that financing was once again cheaper and easier to obtain.

Consumer asset-backed security (ABS) spreads

Net respondents tightening standards

Sources: ABS: J.P. Morgan. Lending standards: Federal Reserve Board, senior loan officer opinion survey on bank lending practices
OUTCOMES

The surge in housing foreclosures stabilized and began to decline, and home prices eventually began to recover.

Foreclosures as a percent of total loans

S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index

Sources: Foreclosure inventory: Mortgage Bankers Association, Bloomberg; home price index: S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index, not seasonally adjusted, via Federal Reserve Economic Data
Employment fell much more during the 2008 crisis than in other recent recessions. Job growth resumed at about the same rate as the recovery from the 2001 recession, and has lasted for more than eight years.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
OUTCOMES

The pace of the recovery in the U.S. was slow, as is typical following a severe financial crisis.

Percentage change in real GDP from peak

+50%

Years after GDP peak

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis via Federal Reserve Economic Data
OUTCOMES

...although growth has been stronger than in many European countries.

Real GDP, percentage change from 4th quarter 2007

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Financial crises are typically costly to economic output, but the U.S. strategy was able to limit the damage compared to other crises.

How bad was the drop in GDP?  
Decline in output peak to trough (real GDP per capita)  
-9.6%  
-5.25%

How long was the recession?  
Duration of recession  
2.9 years  
1.5 years

How fast was the recovery?  
Recovery of output to previous peak  
7.3 years  
5.5 years

Sources: National Bureau of Economic Research, "Recovery from Financial Crises: Evidence from 100 Episodes"; Bureau of Economic Analysis via Federal Reserve Economic Data, internal calculations
**OUTCOMES**

In fact, U.S. taxpayers made a profit on the financial rescue.

Income or cost of financial stability programs, in billions

### Capital Investments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Income/Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GSEs</td>
<td>+$94.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIG</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citigroup</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank of America</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMAC/Ally</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDCI</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrysler Financial</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrysler</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GM</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Liquidity/Credit Markets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Income/Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GSE Debt Purchases</td>
<td>+$12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPFF</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAF</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPIP</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TALF</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSLF</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ML</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDCF</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABCP/MMLF</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Section 7a</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### FDIC Resolution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Income/Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative Income, 2008-10</td>
<td>+$45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIF Losses, 2008-10</td>
<td>-77.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Guarantee Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Income/Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TLGP/DGP</td>
<td>+$10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMF Guarantee</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAG</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: U.S. Treasury; Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.; Federal Reserve Board; Federal Housing Finance Agency; Congressional Research Service, “Costs of Government Interventions in Response to the Financial Crisis: A Retrospective.”

Notes: All figures are reported on a nominal basis. GSE debt purchases as of end of Q3 2013.
**OUTCOMES**

Compared to initial projections and prior crises, the U.S. response was more effective for the taxpayer …

Direct fiscal cost/revenue of financial crisis situations, as a share of GDP

| + 2%       | IMF estimate of the cost of U.S. response to the 2008-9 Financial Crisis |
| 0          | Average cost of recent crises in emerging and developed countries       |
| − 2%       | −2.4% of GDP                                                              |
| − 4%       | Cost of the U.S. savings and loan crisis                                  |
| − 6%       | −10.0% of GDP                                                            |
| − 8%       | −12.7% of GDP                                                            |
| − 10%      | −12.7% of GDP                                                            |
| − 12%      | −12.7% of GDP                                                            |
| − 14%      | −12.7% of GDP                                                            |

**Total direct financial return to the taxpayer from the financial rescue, 2007-16**

+0.78% of GDP

OUTCOMES

...especially relative to the cost of interventions taken by other governments during the global financial crisis.

Cumulative direct fiscal revenues/cost of financial crisis interventions, 2007-16, as a share of each country's 2016 GDP

+1.0%

Sources: Eurostat; U.S. Treasury; Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.; Federal Reserve Board; Federal Housing Finance Agency; Bureau of Economic Analysis; internal calculations
OUTCOMES
Today the financial system has significantly more capital and would be better able to withstand losses in the event of a severe economic downturn.

CET1 and Tier 1 common equity as percent of risk-weighted assets

Bank capital levels

All institutions

Bank holding companies with more than $500 billion in assets

Long after the financial crisis, banks have continued to increase their capital, pushed in large part by more stringent regulatory requirements.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Research and Statistics Group. Note: Capital ratio is based on tier 1 common equity pre-2014 and common equity tier 1 (CET1) as of 2015, and is a combination of the two during 2014.
OUTCOMES

Stronger regulations on risk are applied to a much broader share of the U.S. financial system.

Q4 2007

41% of the financial system faced leverage restrictions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Sector</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Depository Institutions</td>
<td>$13.0 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Sponsored Enterprises</td>
<td>$7.4 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset-Backed Securities</td>
<td>$4.6 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broker-Dealers</td>
<td>$4.7 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Co.’s</td>
<td>$1.9 tn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$31.8 trillion total financial assets

Q4 2017

92% of the financial system faced leverage restrictions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Sector</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Depository Institutions</td>
<td>$18.8 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Sponsored Enterprises</td>
<td>$8.8 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broker-Dealers</td>
<td>$3.2 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABS</td>
<td>$1.2 tn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fin. Co.’s</td>
<td>$1.5 tn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$33.5 trillion total financial assets

Source: Federal Reserve Financial Accounts of the United States
Nonetheless, the emergency authorities available in the U.S. are still too limited to allow an effective response to a severe crisis.

### PRE-CRISIS TOOLS
- Limited reach of prudential limits on leverage
- Limited protections from deposit insurance
- Poor emergency authority
- No ability to inject capital into banks
- No resolution authority for largest banks or investment banks
- No authority to stabilize GSEs

### ESSENTIAL CRISIS AUTHORITIES
- Fed emergency lending
- Broader FDIC guarantees
- GSE conservatorship
- Capital injections

### POST-CRISIS TOOLS
- Much stronger capital requirements
- Much stronger liquidity requirements
- Much stronger funding requirements
- Resolution authority for large financial failures

### POST-CRISIS LIMITATIONS
- Limitations on Fed emergency lending
- No emergency FDIC guarantees without Congressional action.
- No authority to inject capital
This was a terribly damaging crisis. It did not need to be that bad.

The damage illustrates the costs of running a financial system with weak oversight, and of going into a crisis without the essential tools for aggressive early action to prevent disaster.

The recovery was slow and fragile, made slower by the premature shift to tighter fiscal policy.

Even after repairing the immediate damage, the U.S. economy still faces a number of longer-term challenges, with causes that predated the crisis.
Acknowledgments

This chart book was produced as part of an effort led by Ben S. Bernanke, Timothy F. Geithner, and Henry M. Paulson Jr. to examine the U.S. government’s interventions in the 2007-09 financial crisis, a joint project of the Yale School of Management, Program on Financial Stability and Brookings Institution, Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy.

Chart Book Project Advisors: Timothy F. Geithner and Nellie Liang
Chart Book Project Director: Eric Dash  Data Visualization: Seth W. Feaster  Project Manager: Deborah McClellan
Lead Data Analyst: Ben Henken

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Golden Triangle Strategies: Emily Cincebeaux, Bill Marsh, Melissa Wohlgemuth


Data sources: CoreLogic®, a property data and analytics company: Goldman Sachs; HUD; iMoneyNet; JPMorgan Chase; SIFMA
Notes

Slide 6:

Slide 7:

Slide 12:

Slide 14:

Slide 30:
Notes

Slide 32:

Slide 33:

Slide 35:

Slide 36:

Slide 37:
Traditional banks include depository institutions and associated pooled funding trusts. Bank holding companies include bank holding companies, savings and loan holding companies, financial holding companies, and their funding affiliates. Nonbanks include nonbank entities and their affiliates.
Notes

Slide 43:
Based on U.S. Treasury data and AIG infographic and timeline,

Slides 49, 50, 51:
Based on Figure 3, Jason Furman, “Fiscal Policy,” Preliminary Discussion Draft, September 11–12, 2018,

Slide 55:
Monthly mortgage-related securities issuance figures may not match annual figures reported by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association on its website owing to a methodological difference in the reporting of each series.

Slide 56:

Slide 58:
Based on Table 2, “Housing Programs,” forthcoming paper, Michael Barr, Neel Kashkari, Andreas Lehnert, and Phillip L. Swagel, September 11–12, 2018, https://som.yale.edu/the-global-financial-crisis. Some homeowners may have participated in more than one program; the sum of homeowners helped across all categories does not necessarily reflect the number of unique borrowers helped.
Notes

Slide 62:
Maximum commitments were taken from Table 2, Linda S. Goldberg, Craig Kennedy, and Jason Miu “Central Bank Dollar Swap Lines and Overseas Dollar Funding Costs,” NBER working paper 15763, (2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15763.pdf.

Slide 64:
The stock market is measured by total market value as reported by the Center for Research in Security Prices and is shown to financial crisis trough. House prices are shown to three years after peak. Household wealth is a comparison between the change in the annual average (in nominal terms) of household wealth from 1929 to 1930, and the change in the nominal level of household wealth from Q1 2008 to Q1 2009.


Slide 66:
Guarantees: Reflects the U.S. Treasury’s maximum commitments under the Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds and the FDIC’s maximum commitments under the two components of the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, the Debt Guarantee Program, and the Transaction Account Guarantee Program.

Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP): Reflects principal outstanding for TARP programs including bank support programs, credit market programs, auto industry support, assistance to American International Group, and housing programs.
Federal Reserve Liquidity Programs: Reflects loan amounts outstanding under credit and liquidity programs established by the Federal Reserve Board. These include discount window lending (primary credit, secondary credit, and seasonal credit), term auction credit, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, and central bank liquidity swaps. Also reflects the value of outstanding securities lent through the Term Securities Lending Facility.

Other Programs: Reflects the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and Treasury’s commitments under the Asset Guarantee Program; Federal Reserve Board assistance to Maiden Lane companies and support to American International Group; Treasury support for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac through the senior preferred stock purchase agreements, as well as the face value of Treasury’s total mortgage-backed securities (MBS) portfolio at the end of each month, from October 2008 to March 2012.