Yale School of Management

Thurman Arnold Project at Yale

Publications, Scholarly and Popular

Scholarly Publications

The Antitrust Challenge to Covenants Not to Compete in Employment Contracts (Eric Posner) September 2019.

Employee covenants not to compete bar workers who leave their jobs from working for a competing employer for a period of time. The common law regards noncompetes as restraints of trade and imposes a “reasonableness” standard on them; they can also be challenged under the antitrust laws. But new research suggests firms frequently abuse noncompetes, causing significant harm to workers and to the economy. The existing legal approach is inadequate because the common law offers minimal sanctions and antitrust law imposes excessive burdens of proof on plaintiffs. While antitrust law is the appropriate vehicle for challenging noncompetes because of its focus on market effects, it needs to be strengthened.

Mergers, Innovation, and Entry-Exit Dynamics: Consolidation of the Hard Disk Drive Industry, 1996-2016 (Mitsuru Igami & Kosuke Uetakez) The Review of Economic Studies, September 2019.

How far should an industry be allowed to consolidate when competition and innovation are endogenous? We find plateau-shaped equilibrium relationships between competition and innovation, with heterogeneity across time and productivity. Our counterfactual simulations suggest the currentrule-of-thumb policy, which stops mergers when three or fewer firm exist, strikes approximately the right balance between pro-competitive effects and value-destructionside effects in this dynamic welfare tradeoff.

“Do Increasing Markups Matter? Lessons from Empirical Industrial Organization” (Fiona Scott Morton, Steven T. Berry & Martin Gaynor) Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 2019.

This paper considers the recent literature on firm markups in light of both new and classic work in the field of Industrial Organization. We detail the shortcomings of papers that rely on discredited approaches from the “structure-conduct-performance” literature. In contrast, papers based on production function estimation have made useful progress in measuring broad trends in markups. However, industries are so heterogeneous that careful industry specific studies are also required, and sorely needed. Examples of such studies illustrate differing explanations for rising markups, including endogenous increases in fixed cost associated with lower marginal costs. In some industries there is evidence of price increases driven by mergers. To fully understand markups, we must eventually recover the key economic primitives of demand, marginal cost, and fixed and sunk costs. We end by discussing the various aspects of antitrust enforcement that may be of increasing importance regardless of the cause of increased markups.

The Misguided Assault on the Consumer Welfare Standard in the Age of Platform Markets (A. Douglas Melamed & Nicolas Petit) Review of Industrial Organization, June 2019.

In this paper, we discuss whether the consumer welfare (CW) standard needs to be replaced or revised in order for antitrust law to deal effectively with the economic challenges of the platform economy. We argue that both the general and platform-specific assaults on the CW standard are misguided, that the CW standard is capable of addressing the economic concerns that critics have raised, and that the proposed alternatives would make things worse—not better.

The American Express Case: Back to the Future (A. Douglas Melamed) Colorado Technology Law Journal, June 2019.

This paper examines what the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in the American Express case, which is the only U.S. antitrust case that has explicitly addressed the unique issues raised by so-called platform or multi-sided markets, might tell us about the attitudes of the Court’s five-Justice majority about antitrust law.The majority opinion conflated the enduring normative contributions of the Chicago School with its embrace of empirical propositions from 40 years ago that have not stood the test of time and some of which are, in any event, not applicable to two-sided markets. The majority was willing to decide novel issues on the basis of abstract ideas about vertical restraints and free riding that were central to Chicago School analysis 40 years ago but which have since been shown to require more qualification and modification depending on factual context. The majority ignored the fact findings of the district court, and it was plainly willing to increase the risk of false negatives. Its decision was a triumph of ideology over fact-based decision-making.

Killer Acquisitions (Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederer, & Song Ma) June 2019.

This paper argues incumbent firms may acquire innovative targets solely to discontinue the target's innovation projects and preempt future competition. We call such acquisitions "killer acquisitions." We develop a parsimonious model illustrating this phenomenon. Using pharmaceutical industry data, we show that acquired drug projects are less likely to be developed when they overlap with the acquirer's existing product portfolio, especially when the acquirer's market power is large due to weak competition or distant patent expiration. Conservative estimates indicate about 6% of acquisitions in our sample are killer acquisitions. These acquisitions disproportionately occur just below thresholds for antitrust scrutiny.

Toward Controlling Discrimination in Online Ad Auctions (L. Elisa Celis, Anay Mehrotra & Nisheeth K. Vishnoi) May 2019.

Online advertising platforms are thriving due tothe customizable audiences they offer advertisers.However, recent studies show that advertisementscan be discriminatory with respect to the genderor race of the audience that sees the ad, and mayinadvertently  cross  ethical  and/or  legal  bound-aries. To prevent this, we propose a constrained adauction framework that maximizes the platform’srevenue conditioned on ensuring that the audi-ence seeing an advertiser’s ad is distributed ap-propriately across sensitive types such as genderor race.  Building upon Myerson’s classic work,we first present an optimal auction mechanismfor a large class of fairness constraints. Findingthe parameters of this optimal auction, however,turns out to be a non-convex problem. We showthat this non-convex problem can be reformulatedas a more structured non-convex problem withno saddle points or local-maxima; this allows usto develop a gradient-descent-based algorithm tosolve it. Our empirical results on the A1 Yahoo!dataset demonstrate that our algorithm can obtainuniform coverage across different user types foreach advertiser at a minor loss to the revenue ofthe platform, and a small change to the size of theaudience each advertiser reaches.

The Antitrust Paradigm: Restoring a Competitive Economy  (Jonathan B. Baker) Harvard University Press, May 2019.

The U.S. economy is growing less competitive. Large businesses increasingly profit by taking advantage of their customers and suppliers. These firms can also use sophisticated pricing algorithms and customer data to secure substantial and persistent advantages over smaller players. In our new Gilded Age, the likes of Google and Amazon fill the roles of Standard Oil and U.S. Steel. Drawing on the latest in empirical and theoretical economics to defend the benefits of antitrust, Baker shows how enforcement and jurisprudence can be updated for the high-tech economy. His prescription is straightforward. The sooner courts and the antitrust enforcement agencies stop listening to the Chicago school and start paying attention to modern economics, the sooner Americans will reap the benefits of competition.

Markets for Information: An Introduction (Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti) Annual Review of Economics, May 2019.

We survey a recent and growing literature on markets for information. Weoffer a comprehensive view of information markets through an integratedmodel of consumers, information intermediaries, and firms. The model em-beds a large set of applications ranging from sponsored-search advertisingto credit scores to information sharing among competitors. We then zoomin to one of the critical elements in the markets for information: the designof the information. We distinguish between ex ante sales of information (thebuyer acquires an information structure) and ex post sales (the buyer paysfor specific realizations). We relate this distinction to the different productsthat brokers, advertisers, and publishers use to trade consumer informationonline. We discuss the endogenous limits to the trade of information that de-rive from the potential adverse use of information to the consumers. Finally,we discuss recommender systems and other information filtering systemsthat use artificial intelligence to predict ratings or preferences in marketsfor indirect information.

Measuring the Incentive to Collude: The Vitamin Cartels, 1990-1999  (Mitsuru Igamiy & Takuo Sugaya) May 2019.

 This paper studies the stability of the vitamincartels in the 1990s and presents a repeated-games approach to quantify “coordinated effects” of a merger.  We use data and direct evidence from American courts and European agencies to show the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) of the short-lived vitamin C cartel was likely to be violated when it actually collapsed in 1995,whereas the ICCs of the long-lived cartels (vitamins A and E, and beta carotene) were satisfied until the prosecution in 1999. Simulations suggest some mergers could haveprolonged the vitamin C cartel, but others could have further destabilized it, because both the direction and magnitude of “coordinated effects” depend not only on the number of firms but also on their cost asymmetry.

FTC v. Qualcomm: New Frontiers in the Antitrust-IP Interface (Erik Hovenkamp) Regulatory Review, May 2019.

The Federal Trade Commission recently scored a substantial victory in its antitrust suit against Qualcomm. The case represents a novel confluence of standard-setting and IP licensing issues with bedrock antitrust subjects: tying and exclusive dealing. It also takes a surprising turn in resuscitating the long-dormant doctrine of the antitrust “duty to deal.” In this short essay, I review and evaluate the court’s decision in FTC v. Qualcomm. The analysis of Qualcomm’s exclusive dealing is sound and very likely correct. However, the court’s duty-to-deal analysis sits on shakier ground, omitting consideration of potential immunity under the Patent Act and sidestepping thorny questions on the appropriate source of law.

Antitrust As Allocator of Coordination Rights (Sanjukta Paul) UCLA Law Review, April 2019.

This paper develops a novel framework for understanding antitrust law. Antitrust’s primary function—to allocate economic coordination rights—is discursively submerged, yet logically inescapable. Under current law, these criteria amount to a preference for coordination through concentrated control, and are treated as neutral economic principles. In reality, they constitute autonomous legal judgments that cannot be derived from an external referent.

Fissuring and the Firm Exemption (Sanjukta Paul) Law and Contemporary Problems, April 2019.

This paper applies the conceptual framework developed in Antitrust as Allocator to the business arrangements that constitute the “fissured workplace” or the gig economy, discussing the permissive antitrust doctrines that make these arrangements possible. 

Five Principles for Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy (Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy L. Rose, Steven C. Salop, & Fiona Scott Morton) April 2019.

There seems to be consensus that the Department of Justice’s 1984 Vertical Merger Guidelines do not reflect either modern theoretical and empirical economic analysis or current agency enforcement policy. Yet widely divergent views of preferred enforcement policies have been expressed among agency enforcers and commentators. Based on our review of the relevant economic literature and our experience analyzing vertical mergers, we recommend that the enforcement agencies adopt five principles: (i) The agencies should consider and investigate the full range of potential anticompetitive harms when evaluating vertical mergers; (ii) The agencies should decline to presume that vertical mergers benefit competition on balance in the oligopoly markets that typically prompt agency review, nor set a higher evidentiary standard based on such a presumption; (iii) The agencies should evaluate claimed efficiencies resulting from vertical mergers as carefully and critically as they evaluate claimed efficiencies resulting from horizontal mergers, and require the merging parties to show that the efficiencies are verifiable, merger-specific and sufficient to reverse the potential anticompetitive effects; (iv) The agencies should decline to adopt a safe harbor for vertical mergers, even if rebuttable, except perhaps when both firms compete in unconcentrated markets; (v) The agencies should consider adopting rebuttable anticompetitive presumptions that a vertical merger harms competition when certain factual predicates are satisfied. We do not intend these presumptions to describe all the ways by which vertical mergers can harm competition, so the agencies should continue to investigate vertical mergers that raise concerns about input and customer foreclosure, loss of a disruptive or maverick firm, evasion of rate regulation or other threats to competition, even if the specific factual predicates of the presumptions are not satisfied.

Why Has Antitrust Law Failed Workers? (Ioana Elena Marinescu & Eric A. Posner)  April 2019.

In the last several years, economists have learned about an antitrust problem of vast scope. Far from approximating the conditions of perfect competition as long assumed, most labor markets are characterized by monopsony — meaning that employers pay workers less than their productivity because workers lack a credible threat to quit and find a higher-paying job in the same market. Yet while antitrust law regulates labor monopsony in the same way as it regulates monopoly on the product market side, antitrust litigation against employers is rare. We document both the magnitude of labor monopsony and the paucity of cases, and argue that this “litigation gap” exists because antitrust case law, which has developed through product-side litigation, is poorly tailored to labor-side problems. We conclude with four proposals for reform of antitrust law so it can better deter labor monopsony.

“Antitrust and Innovation: Welcoming and Protecting Disruption” (Fiona Scott Morton, Giulio Federico & Carl Shapiro) Innovation Policy and Economy,  April 2019.

The goal of antitrust policy is to protect and promote a vigorous competitive process. Effective rivalry spurs firms to introduce new and innovative products, as they seek to capture profitable sales from their competitors and to protect their existing sales from future challengers. In this fundamental way, competition promotes innovation. We apply this basic insight to the antitrust treatment of horizontal mergers and of exclusionary conduct by dominant firms. A merger between rivals internalizes business-stealing effects arising from their parallel innovation efforts and thus tends to depress innovation incentives. Merger-specific synergies, such as the internalization of involuntary spillovers or an increase in the productivity of R&D, may offset the adverse effect of a merger on innovation. We describe the possible effects of a merger on innovation by developing a taxonomy of cases, with reference to recent U.S. and E.U. examples. A dominant firm may engage in exclusionary conduct to eliminate the threat from disruptive firms. This suppresses innovation by foreclosing disruptive rivals and by reducing the pressure to innovative on the incumbent. We apply this broad principle to possible exclusionary strategies by dominant firms.

Ownership Concentration and Strategic Supply Reduction (Ulrich Doraszelski, Katja Seim, Michael Sinkinson, & Peichun Wang) April 2019.

We explore the implications of ownership concentration for the recently-concluded incentive auction that re-purposed spectrum from broadcast TV to mobile broadband usage in the U.S. We document significant multi-license ownership of TV stations. We show that in the reverse auction, in which TV stations bid to relinquish their licenses, multi-license owners have anincentive to withhold some TV stations to drive up prices for their remaining TV stations. Using a large-scale valuation exercise, we find that this strategic supply reduction conservatively increases payouts to TV stations by between 7.0% and 20.7%.

Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs, and Antitrust Policy (Erik Hovenkamp & Kevin Bryan) University of Chicago Law Review, April 2019.

Startup acquisitions by dominant incumbents, especially in high-tech, have recently attracted significant attention. Many researchers and practitioners worry about harms to competition or innovation. However, there has been very little antitrust enforcement in this area. This is emblematic of a prominent feature of modern antitrust law: a strong preference for erring on the side of non-enforcement. A leading rationale for this preference is the claim that market power self-corrects by attracting new entrants who discipline incumbents.  As a result, plaintiffs generally face very demanding evidentiary requirements, which are particularly hard to satisfy in the case of startup acquisitions. A typical startup is both new and small, providing little data for estimating competitive effects. Despite this uncertainty, it is unlikely that society is best served by a policy of near-universal inaction. Recent work in economics, both empirical and theoretical, identifies various harms to competition and innovation as a result of startup acquisitions in concentrated markets. Further, the traditional error cost argument is particularly in-apposite in this context, as startup acquisitions may be undertaken precisely because they forestall competitive entry. We therefore argue for expanded antitrust intervention (i.e. more than zero) in startup acquisitions by dominant incumbents. In practice, the acquirer’s market power and the transaction value may be useful signals of the risk of harm.

The Economics of Social Data (Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti) March 2019.

Large internet platforms collect data from individual users in almost every interaction on theinternet. Whenever an individual browses a news website, searches for a medical term or for a travelrecommendation, or simply checks the weather forecast on an app, that individual generates data.A central feature of the data collected from the individuals is its social aspect. Namely, the datacaptured from an individual user is not only informative about this speciÖc individual, but also aboutusers in some metric similar to the individual. Thus, theindividual datais reallysocial data. Thesocial nature of the data generates aninformational externalitythat we investigate in this note.

Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions (Erik Hovenkamp & Kevin Bryan) Review of Industrial Organization, March 2019.

Should there be limits on startup acquisitions by dominant firms? Efficiency requires that startups sell their technology to the right incumbents, that they develop the right technology, and that they invest the right amount in R&D. In a model of differentiated oligopoly, we show distortions along all three margins if there are no limits on startup acquisition. Leading incumbents make acquisitions partially to keep lagging incumbents from catching up technologically. When startups can choose what technology they invent, they are biased toward inventions which improve the leader's technology rather than those which help the laggard incumbent catch up. Further, upon obtaining a pure monopoly, the leading incumbent's marginal willingness to pay for new technologies falls abruptly, diminishing private returns on future innovations. We consider antitrust measures that could help to mitigate these problems.

The Common Ownership Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence  (Matthew Backus, Christopher Conlon, & Michael Sinkinson) February 2019.

Under one model of corporate governance that embraces a strict interpretation of the common ownership hypothesis, the authors calculate that in 1980 an average S&P 500 firm would have valued a dollar of profits to another randomly chosen S&P 500 component firm at 20 cents. By the end of 2017, this more than tripled to approximately 70 cents. If common ownership incentives translate to firm behavior, this rise would give firms an incentive to raise prices even in the absence of collusion (which would be illegal).

 Controlling Polarization in Personalization: An Algorithmic Framework (L. Elisa Celis, Sayash Kapoor, Farnood Salehi & Nisheeth Vishnoi), January 2019.

 Personalization is pervasive in the online space as it leads to higher efficiency for the user and higher revenue for the platform by individualizing the most relevant content for each user. However, recent studies suggest that such personalization can learn and propagate systemic biases and polarize opinions; this has led to calls for regulatory mechanisms and algorithms that are constrained to combat bias and the resulting echo-chamber effect. We propose a versatile framework that allows for the possibility to reduce polarization in personalized systems by allowing the user to constrain the distribution from which content is selected. We then present a scalable algorithm with provable guarantees that satisfies the given constraints on the types of the content that can be displayed to a user, but -- subject to these constraints -- will continue to learn and personalize the content in order to maximize utility. We illustrate this framework on a curated dataset of online news articles that are conservative or liberal, show that it can control polarization, and examine the trade-off between decreasing polarization and the resulting loss to revenue. We further exhibit the flexibility and scalability of our approach by framing the problem in terms of the more general diverse content selection problem and test it empirically on both a News dataset and the MovieLens dataset.

Labor Monopsony and the Limits of the Law (Suresh Naidu & Eric Posner) January 2019.

Recent literature has suggested that antitrust regulation is an appropriate response to labor market monopsony. This article qualifies the primacy of antitrust by arguing that a significant degree of labor market power is “frictional,” that is, without artificial barriers to entry or excessive concentration of employment. If monopsony is pervasive under conditions of laissez-faire, antitrust is likely to play only a partial role in remedying it, and other legal and policy instruments to intervene in the labor market will be required.

A Proposal to Enhance Antitrust Protection Against Labor Market Monopsony (Ioana Elena Marinescu & Eric A. Posner) December 2018.

Recent empirical studies have revealed that labor market monopsony is far more common than previously thought, and that there is a strong correlation between wage suppression and labor market concentration. Yet few antitrust cases have been brought by workers against employers who exercise significant market power against them, and hardly any such cases have been successful. In contrast, antitrust cases against monopolists on the product market side are common. We argue that section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits certain forms of monopolization (and has been interpreted to apply to labor market monopsonization as well) is insufficient for addressing monopsonization of labor markets because of structural differences between labor markets and product markets. We propose a new statute that would strengthen the law by giving employees a more robust claim against labor monopsonists who abuse their market power.

 The Limits of Antitrust in Privacy Protection (Eugene Kimmelman, Harold Feld & Agustin Rossi) International Data Privacy Law, November 2018.

 Key Points: (1) Antitrust has been put forward as a tool to defend consumers’ privacy. (2) Antitrust should encourage non-price competition, and can be the right tool to fight anti-competitive hoarding of personal data. (3) However, antitrust in general is not the right tool to address, nor the right conceptual framework to analyse, privacy harms. (4) Instead, a comprehensive approach to consumer protection is needed.

Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives (Miguel Anton, Florian Ederer, Mireia Gine, & Martin C. Schmalz) September 2018.

When one firm's strategy affects other firms' value, optimal executive incentives depend on whether shareholders have interests in only one or in multiple firms. Performance-sensitive contracts induce managerial effort to reduce costs, and lower costs induce higher output. Hence, greater managerial effort can lead to lower product prices and industry profits. Therefore, steep managerial incentives can be optimal for a single firm and at the same time violate the interests of common owners of several firms in the same industry. Empirically, managerial wealth is more sensitive to performance when a firm's largest shareholders do not own large stakes in competitors.

Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement, Collection, Yale Law Journal, May 2018.

There is no antitrust law without antitrust law enforcement. Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement contends that existing tools to advance antitrust enforcement are well-suited to confront today’s U.S. antitrust challenges. Primarily focused on efforts by the federal antitrust agencies, these Features lay the foundation for an overarching enforcement agenda.

A gun control solution manufacturers can get behind ( Ian Ayres & Abraham L. Wickelgren) Brookings, March 2018.

One of the more daunting tasks in the current struggle to pass sensible gun control legislation is how to neutralize the political power of gun manufacturers who potentially have hundreds of millions of dollars at stake.  But there is a straightforward, if perverse, way to co-opt the gun industry into supporting some restrictions: Help firearm manufacturers cartelize their industry. Congress could immunize gun manufacturers from antitrust liability—making it legal for them to collude and raise gun prices.  Our antitrust laws are designed to prevent firms from agreeing to limit supply in order raise prices. In most markets, this is in the service of protecting consumers and enhancing efficiency. But for products that cause harm, both the public and the producers of the product can benefit from higher prices and reduced supply. Legalizing a gun cartel by itself is a kind of gun control. Just as OPEC is the friend of any environmentalist who wants to reduce oil consumption, a gun manufacturing cartel will reduce the quantity of guns sold in order to raise prices.

Popular Publications


Only Regulation Can Jumpstart Competition in Big Tech (Gene Kimmelman & Charlotte Slaiman) Fortune,  July 2019.

No matter what antitrust investigations into big tech find, the best way to increase competition among digital platforms so that the next Google or next Facebook can survive is by creating a regulatory agency to stand watch. Antitrust law can stop anticompetitive behavior, but it cannot overcome or eliminate the natural economic characteristics of these markets that make competition so difficult. This means we need new laws that force the tech giants to play well with others, and we need an agency to enforce them.

The Double Standard of Antitrust Law (Sanjukta Paul) The American Prospect, June 2019.

How today’s antitrust law strengthens top-down corporate control and weakens democratic cooperation.

Elizabeth Warren Has a Theory About Corporate Power (Stacy Mitchell) The Atlantic, May 2019.

The left forgot what Roosevelt knew: Small businesses and corporate behemoths have different interests.

“Confronting Rising Market Power” (Jonathan B. Baker & Fiona Scott Morton), Economics for Inclusive Prosperity Policy Brief, May 2019.

Rising market power in the U.S. economy is not just a microeconomic problem, as the textbook analysis shows, creating allocative efficiency losses and transferring wealth away from victimized participants in the affected markets.  Rising market power also undermines inclusive prosperity by contributing to inequality and slowed economic growth.  Modern economic research points to multiple ways to attack market power and enhance competition, including ways of strengthening antitrust enforcement, improving antitrust rules and institutions, and deploying regulation to enhance competition.

To Revive Rural America, We Must Fix Our Broken Food System (Austin Frerick) The American Conservative, February 2019.

America’s agricultural system has become extractive, and more and more of the profits are flowing to a few. This article calls for restoring the balance of power in America's food system in favor of farmers, workers, and small businesses via changes to antitrust law and enforcement.

How the Federal Government Rigs the Game Against Small Businesses (Stacy Mitchell) The Washington Monthly, February 2019.

An FTC-approved merger will help Staples and Amazon crush the independent office-supply industry.

Revitalizing U.S. antitrust enforcement is not simply a contest between Brandeis and Bork—look first to Thurman Arnold (Jonathan B. Baker) Competitive Edge, January 2019.

Restoring competition requires stronger antitrust rules than those adopted four decades ago. The Chicago era rules have failed to deter anticompetitive conduct adequately, in part because they rely on what turned out to be erroneous assumptions about markets and institutions. But restoring competition does not mean returning to the rules established in Arnold’s time. The structural era rules were not created for an information technology economy, and their revival would excessively chill efficiencies.  Instead, enforcers and courts should bring modern economic thinking to bear.

Market Power or Just Scale Economies? (Jonathan B. Baker) Pro-Market, December 2018.

While increased economies of scale may offer a partial explanation for higher margins and declining dynamism in the US economy, growing market power provides a better explanation, argues Jonathan Baker.

Antitrust Alone Won’t Save Us From the “Curse of Bigness” (Gene Kimmelman & Charlotte Slaiman) Medium, November 2018.

If we can galvanize support for stronger antitrust, then surely we can create the additional accountability tools and enforcement practices needed to thoroughly challenge the dangers of economic and political concentration of power. One tool is not enough — we need a full array of public oversight to begin undoing past mistakes and meeting new challenges posed by tech. Achieving more competitive economic markets that expand the marketplace of ideas and protect our democracy requires both antitrust law and regulation working hand in hand.

“Amazon Doesn’t Just Want to Dominate the Market—It Wants to Become the Market” (Stacy Mitchell) The Nation, February 2018.

The company is a radically new kind of monopoly with ambitions that dwarf those of earlier empires.

“6 Ways to Rein In Today’s Toxic Monopolies” (Stacy Mitchell) The Nation, February 2018.

Monopolies are strangling competition and cutting off opportunity. Here’s how to stop them.

The Rise and Fall of the Word 'Monopoly' in American Life (Stacy Mitchell) The Atlantic, June 2017.

For several decades, the term was a fixture of newspaper headlines and campaign speeches. Then something changed.

Foundational economics needed for enforcement in digital businesses 

TAP@Yale will collaborate with the Tobin Center for Economic Policy to explore questions related to the economic effects of antitrust policy.

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